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I. INTRODUCTION
The recently published Volume 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm,' is a first-rate achievement, all
the more so considering that it was captained by a succession of Reporters
and underwent more than its fair share of twists and turns2 as it wound its
way to its final version and publication. It is regrettable, however, that in
this latest torts restatement project, the American Law Institute ("Institute")
was not able to address completely the nature of the intent required for
traditional intentional torts to the person, such as battery. I hope the matter
will be dealt with and perfected in a restatement project in the near future.
The new Restatement (Third) defines intent in its first section, stating
that "[a] person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if . .. the
person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or ... acts
knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result."4  This
definition is an umbrella one, providing an all-inclusive definition of what it
means to "intend" something. It simply defines the state of mind needed to
support a finding that a defendant intended "something" as a "consequence."
But, before a person may be determined to have entertained the necessary
intent for a specific tort, we have to also know what "consequence" must
have been intended for that tort. The Section 1 definition does not address
that aspect of intent-the nature of the "consequence" that must have been
intended to support various traditional torts that require intent, such as
battery. Rather, for the present, it expressly defers to the Restatement
(Second) sections that address the substantive details and elements of those
torts.5 The comments state that the "Restatement (Second), Torts, remains
largely authoritative in explaining the details of the specific torts
encompassed by this Section and in specifying the elements and limits of the
various affirmative defenses that might be available."6 Thus, the current
project did not address one dimension of the concept of intent. For further
elaboration we are told to look to the Restatement (Second), which continues
to govern such torts "until future installments of the Restatement Third,
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
2. Emblematically, as it has wound its way toward final approval through various drafts, the
new Restatement has had a variety of titles. In 1998, it was Restatement (Third) of Torts: General
Principles (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 1998). In 2001, the title changed to the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Basic Principles) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2001). In 2005, the
title became the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm (Proposed Final Draft No.
1, 2005). And, in 2006, the title ultimately became the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm (Council Draft No. 6, 2006), the title used in the final published
version of Volume 1 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
(2010).
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
4. Id.§ 1.
5. Id§ I cmt. a.
6. Id 5 cmt. a.
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Torts"7 deal with such matters.
Battery is the first intentional tort addressed in the Restatement
(Second)9 and the most useful one with which to illustrate the continuing
ambiguity of the torts restatements. It states in part that for a battery, the
defendant must have intended "to cause a harmful or offensive contact . .. or
an imminent apprehension of such contact . .. [and such contact] results."'o
But the language, "intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact," is
unclear on precisely what "consequences" must have been intended to
support the tort of battery. It does not tell us whether a defendant must have
merely intended a contact (or its apprehension) that turns out to be harmful
or offensive; or a defendant must have not only intended the contact (or its
apprehension), but also intended that it be harmful or offensive." It leaves
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM intro. at 1
(2010) ("Although this Restatement provides a definition of intent and the basis for liability for
intentionally caused harm, it does not address the specific intentional physical-harm torts or their
elements. That law has not undergone significant change since the Second Restatement of Torts and
remains govemed by it until future installments of the Restatement Third, Torts, address it."); see
also id. § 5 cmt. a.
8. A number of Restatement (Third) of Torts projects are apparently contemplated or at least
under consideration, one of which would perhaps be devoted to "Intentional Torts to Persons." Ellen
Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1383, 1392 (2009). Three projects have been at or are near completion: Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability (1998), Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability § 22
(2000), and Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm (2010) (Volume
1 of which has been published). At least five additional projects may be undertaken "that might
someday constitute the volumes of the Restatement (Third)," one of which would address
"Intentional Torts to Persons." Pryor, supra, at 1389. That Restatement (Third) module-volume
would cover "battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
relevant defenses and privileges, and relevant remedies." Id. at 1392. See generally Ellen M.
Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional Harm to Persons-Thoughts, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1335 (2009) (offering thoughtful suggestions and ideas on the title and
coverage of such a project).
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13-20 (1965).
10. Id. §§ 13, 16, 18, 20.
11. The question has been recognized by quite a few authorities. See, e.g., White v. Muniz, 999
P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. 2000) (addressing the question "whether an intentional tort requires some proof
that the tortfeasor not only intended to contact another person, but also intended that the contact be
harmful or offensive to the other person"); Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 603 (Utah 2005) (stating
the issue as whether "the only intent required under the statute is simply the intent to make a
contact," or whether it "requires the actor to intend harm or offense through his deliberate contact");
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 58 (2000) [hereinafter DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS] (posing the
question "[w]hether the plaintiff shows intent by showing merely an intent to touch that turned out to
be offensive or harmful, or whether she must show that the harm or offense was also intended");
MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW 120-21 (2008) (recognizing the question whether battery requires
merely "intent to cause a contact that turns out to be harmful or offensive," or also "to cause harm or
offense," and noting the disagreement among the courts between the "single-intent and the dual-
intent interpretations" of the definition of battery); Bublick, supra note 8, at 1343 ("[In] the context
of battery ... some courts recognize liability in cases in which the defendant has an intent to contact,
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unanswered whether the consequence that the defendant must have intended
encompasses merely intent to cause contact (or its apprehension), or also
requires in addition an intent that the contact (or its apprehension) cause a
harmful or offensive effect. These two rules have been referred to as the
"single intent" and "dual intent" requirements, respectively.12
Thus, neither the Second nor, thus far, the Third Restatements resolve
whether the consequence that a defendant must have intended is satisfied by
merely intent to contact (the so-called single intent approach), or also
requires in addition an intent that the contact cause a harmful or offensive
effect (the so-called dual intent approach). By opting to continue, at least for
now, with the Restatement (Second) provisions, the Restatement (Third) will
perpetuate the ambiguity and uncertainty resulting from the failure of the
Restatement (Second) to clearly define the actionable consequence that must
be intended for these torts. The effect will be to largely continue with the
archetypal ambiguity that began in the First Restatement in 1935.13
In fairness, it is understandable that at this time the various drafters of
the latest project of the Restatement (Third) may have been disinclined to
undertake to deal specifically with the elements and details of the traditional
intentional torts, such as battery. A comprehensive revision of the full range
of material on the traditional intentional torts to the person could have
delayed revision of the important materials that were (or will soon be)
addressed in the latest project.14  On the other hand, the new Restatement
but not an intent to harm. This is particularly true in single-intent jurisdictions in which intent to
harm is not recognized as a necessary element of the battery tort."); Craig M. Lawson, The Puzzle of
Intended Harm in the Tort ofBattery, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 355, 35657, 36263 (2001) (identifying the
two rules); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Tortious Battery: Is "I Didn't Mean Any Harm " Relevant?, 37
OKLA. L. REv. 717, 717 (1984) (stating that the Restatement "equivocates," and asking "[d]oes this
mean intent to cause contact that in fact turns out to be harmful or offensive, or does it mean intent
to harm or offend?"); Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) ofIntentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1061, 1066 (2006) ("Must the defendant intend only to cause the contact? Or must she also
intend that the contact be harmful or offensive?"); cf Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray:
On Battery, Wrongful Living, and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997, 1011
(1999) ("Regrettably, the language commonly used to describe the necessary intent is open to
misinterpretation.").
12. See, e.g., White, 999 P.2d at 817 (referring to the "dual intent" requirement); DAN B. DOBBS
ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
INJURY 51 n.2 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION] (alluding to
the "single intent" and "dual intent" rules); GEISTFELD, supra note 11, at 121 (referring to the
"single-intent" and the "dual-intent" interpretation of the definition of battery); Simons, supra note
11, at 1066 (referring to the "dual intent or single intent" question and rules).
The "dual intent" terminology refers to the question of the consequences that must have been
intended for the purposes of battery. The terminology should be distinguished from the "dual
definition" phrase used in the Restatement itself. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 cmt. a & Reporters' Note cmt. a (2010). The latter phrase refers
to the two bases in section I for establishing that a defendant entertained the requisite state of mind
with respect to the required consequences (whatever they are).
13. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
14. Those include important sections on one aspect of intent, negligence liability, strict liability,
causation, and proximate cause that were addressed in the completed Volume 1, and sections on duty
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does devote a section to the nature of intent. In doing so, it leaves one
crucial aspect of the element of intent in continuing uncertainty: the nature
of the consequences that must be intended for the traditional intentional
torts, including the bedrock tort of battery. Ideally, a comprehensive
revision of the elements and details governing the traditional intentional torts
to the person, such as battery, would have been included in the current
project. However, if that was not feasible, then the latest project should
have, at a minimum, clarified the nature of the consequence that must have
been intended for the purposes of the traditional intentional personal injury
torts, such as battery, notwithstanding that those torts would be
comprehensively explored in some later project.
In the present Article, I will first elaborate on the current uncertainty of
the nature of the intended consequence for traditional personal injury torts,
focusing on the quintessential intentional tort of battery. 5 I will also discuss
why I believe it is important for the Institute to clarify the concept of intent
relating to battery and other traditional intentional torts.' 6
Second, I shall proffer a formulation of one possible way to reduce the
uncertainty regarding the meaning of intent for the purposes of battery."
Namely, for the purposes of the intent requirement, I propose that in addition
to proving that the defendant intended to cause the subject contact (or its
apprehension), the plaintiff should also have to prove either: (1) that the
defendant entertained a purpose or knew to a substantial certainty that the
contact or its apprehension would be harmful or offensive, or alternatively,
(2) that immediately prior to initiating the contact, the defendant both (a)
knew that valid consent was required or that in its absence the contact or its
apprehension would be of a harmful or offensive character, and (b) either (i)
was aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the absence of or deviation
from the reasonably evident consent of the contemplated recipient of the
contact (meaning aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the absence of
issues, standalone emotional distress claims, and liability of possessors of land, among others, that
will be included in the second volume of this current Restatement (Third) project. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (2010);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM Reps. Mem.
(Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009) ("In this Tentative Draft we have the penultimate Chapter of the
project that has come to be known, after an ALI record number of name changes, as Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm. This Chapter addresses the duties applicable to land possessors for
harm that occurs to entrants on land from risks existing on that land; one Section treats land
possessors' duties to those off the land. The final Chapter will concern the liability of actors who
engage independent contractors. That Chapter, to be written by Professor Ellen Pryor, will complete
the work.").
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
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or his own lack of knowledge of information that a reasonable person would
understand as establishing the existence of consent of the contemplated
recipient of the contact, or aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the
existence of information a reasonable person would understand as being
inconsistent with the consent of the contemplated recipient of the contact),
or (ii) did not honestly believe that he had valid consent of the contemplated
recipient of the contact.' 8
Finally, I will take the occasion of the publication of volume 1 of the
latest torts restatement project as an opportunity to reflect on the province
and role of restatements. 9 As they craft restatements, I believe the drafters
and the Institute should be guided by two goals. The first is to address and
reduce uncertainty and complexity in the law, and, as adjuvant, to keep the
restatement provisions current and vital. Second, I believe those formulating
and revising restatements should consider not only the aim to "restate" the
law, if the state of the law and its stability, salience, and broad-based
acceptance make it feasible and appropriate to do so, but should also
thoughtfully assess and guide the law's development. Thus, I believe the
drafters and the Institute should embrace a broadly conceived, creative
orientation, which is not inordinately focused on creating provisions that are
reflections of composite nose counts, especially when faced with a
conflicting, fluid, or largely indeterminate and opaque state law tapestry on a
particular issue. The formulation of restatements should be informed not
only by a sense of the weight of authority, but also guided by sound
underlying policy goals. In particular, I will examine the evolving role of
restatements and assess the validity of the putative dichotomy on whether to
restate the law as it is (or may once have been) or to state the law as it ought
to be.
II. DOCTRINAL UNCERTAINTY
A. The Inchoate Definition ofIntent and the Meaning of "Consequence"
To prevail on a battery claim, the plaintiff must have suffered a
nonconsensual harmful or offensive contact. 20 But the fact that the plaintiff
experienced such a contact is not alone sufficient to support liability for
battery. To satisfy the essential intent element, the plaintiff must also prove
that the defendant intentionally caused the actionable contact. 21 This intent
element has two dimensions. One relates to the required state of mind of the
defendant, and the other (and the focus of this Article) to the consequence
18. See infra Part Ill.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 55-57.
21. Id. at 58.
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that must have been intended under the requisite state of mind.22
Again, the Restatement (Third) defines the requisite state of mind that
an actor must entertain for the purposes of intent. It states that "[a] person
acts with the intent to produce a consequence if .. . the person acts with the
purpose of producing that consequence; or ... acts knowing that the
consequence is substantially certain to result."23 This generic 24 definition is
designed to provide an all-inclusive definition of what it means to "intend"
something. It simply defines the state of mind needed to support a finding
that a defendant intended a "consequence;" it does not delineate the nature
of the consequence that must have been "intended," nor is it particularized to
specific torts. It defines when an actor intended an actionable result.25 But,
before a person may be determined to have entertained the necessary intent
for a specific tort, we must also know what "consequence" (or threshold
actionable result) must have been intended for that tort. The use of this
generic and inchoate formulation made it essential that the relevant
consequence be identified for the particular intentional tort to which the
state-of-mind intent rule was to be applicable. But, with respect to many of
the traditional intentional torts, such as battery, the new Restatement defers
further elaboration, stating in its Introduction that "[a]lthough this
Restatement provides a definition of intent and the basis for liability for
intentionally caused harm, it does not address the specific intentional
physical-harm torts or their elements,"26 which remain governed by the
Second Restatement of Torts until addressed in "future installments of the
Restatement Third, Torts."2 A comment explains:
The rule of liability in this Section does not replace the doctrines for
specific intentional torts, such as battery, assault, false
22. Id.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010).
24. An earlier draft version of this section defined intent with reference to "harm." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § I (Discussion Draft 1999) (stating that
"[a]n actor's causation of harm is intentional if the actor brings about that harm either purposefully
or knowingly"). The substitution of the current "consequence" language was a shift to more neutral,
generic terminology. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in
Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1133, 1135, 1153 (2001) (advocating
a generic formulation, contending that definition of intent should be couched in terms of a generic
perspective, with terminology not tied to any specific tort).
25. An earlier treatise by William L. Prosser, the Reporter for the 1965 instilment of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, described intent as "an intent to bring about a result which will
invade the interests of another in a way that the law will not sanction." WILLIAM L. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS iii (1965).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM intro. at 1
(2010).
27. Id. at 1-2.
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imprisonment, and others. Rather, this Section provides a
framework that encompasses many specific torts for intentionally
caused physical harm. Restatement Second, Torts, remains largely
authoritative in explaining the details of the specific torts
encompassed by this Section and in specifying the elements and
limits of the various affirmative defenses that might be available
until the Third Restatement addresses the specific intentional torts.28
We are told that relevant law on these torts "has not undergone
significant change since the Second Restatement . . . ."29  The Reporters'
Notes to an earlier draft offered the following reassurance: "It is possible
that intentional-tort doctrine-then and now-limits the amount of litigation
necessary to resolve claims because it is so clear as to encourage the filing of
meritorious claims yet prevent the need for subsequent appeals."30 If only it
were so clear and simple in reality.
The latest project of the Restatement (Third) thus incorporates by
reference the earlier Restatement (Second) formulation on the details of the
intent requirement for battery and other traditional intentional torts. The
latest project does not explicitly address the nature of the consequence that
must have been intended in its black-letter provisions. Crucially, it does not
specify whether the consequence that the defendant must have intended
encompasses merely intent to cause contact (or its apprehension), the so-
called single intent rule, or also requires in addition an intent that effect of
the contact (or its apprehension) be harmful or offensive, the so-called dual
intent rule. 31 At most, sparse, intermittent language in the comments hints
vaguely and obliquely at the answer.
Some language in the comments seems to imply support for a dual
intent approach that would require, in addition to intent to cause the contact,
intent to cause harm or offense. The comments note that "[i]n general, the
intent required in order to show that the defendant's conduct is an intentional
tort is the intent to bring about harm (more precisely, to bring about the type
of harm to an interest that the particular tort seeks to protect)."32 However,
28. Id § 5 cmt. a.
29. Id intro. at 1.
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 5, Reporters'
Note cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § I cmt. b
(2010). The comment also notes that "when tort-liability rules do attach significance to intended
consequences, most of the time the consequence in question is the fact of harm, and it is the intention
to cause such harm that under ordinary tort discourse renders the actor liable for an intentional
tort[,]" and refers to the "focus of intentional torts on the intention to produce harm . . . ." Id; see
also id. § I illus. (suggesting that doctor who mistakenly gives the patient the wrong medication was
not liable for battery because she was not substantially certain it would cause him harm); id. § I cmt.
d (stating generally that "[a]n intentional tort requires that the actor desires the harm to occur or
knows that the harm is substantially certain to occur"). See generally id. ch. 4, Scope Note (stating
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the level of generality and the failure to specifically address the issue in the
context of battery tend to cloud the meaning and force of the language. This
is especially so in light of the fact that the latest Restatement broadly defers
to the Second Restatement on the details of torts such as battery, presumably
including the issue of the consequences that must have been intended for
specific torts. And the problem is that the Second Restatement provisions
are not only unclear and contradictory on this, but some language in its
comments may arguably point in the other direction, toward a single intent
rule, and thus conflicts with the implication of the preceding language from
the Restatement (Third) comments.33 Nor were the discussions of the
Restatement (Third) at the 2001 proceedings conclusive on the matter,
although they arguably may lean toward the single intent rule.34 Some
comments elsewhere in a different Restatement (Third) project might
arguably assume a single intent rule, but they also express ambivalence
about it.35
that "liability for negligence or for intent is liability based on fault").
33. See infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
34. Some remarks at the 2001 ALI annual meeting discussing intent seem less than definitive,
although ultimately perhaps favoring a single intent rule. Professor Richard W. Wright said that for
some intentional torts, such as "offensive battery, . . . all you have to do is intend a certain
consequence-the physical contact with the person for a battery . . . ." The American Law Institute
Seventy-Eighth Annual Meeting, 78 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 35 (2001). He added that "even if you make a
good-faith mistake about thinking . . . you have consent, there is no intent to harm, no intent to
embarrass, the tort still exists." Id. This latter language by Wright seems to contemplate a single
intent (mere intent to contact) rule. The Reporter, Professor Michael D. Green, then stated that "we
agree with Professor Wright's point." Id. Wright also arguably suggests a mere intent to contact
rule in the text of a proposed amendment to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical &
Emotional Harm § 1 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001):
[S]ome intentional torts do not require the intent to cause harm, but rather only the intent
to cause a certain mental or physical consequence. This is true for the intentional torts of
assault, [and] offensive battery .... For a battery, the required intended consequence is
merely a physical contact with the person of the plaintiff . . .. Although the essence of
the injury in each case is an invasion of one's dignity or autonomy, there need not even
be the intent to cause this non-physical, dignitary harm ....
The American Law Institute Seventy-Eighth Annual Meeting, supra, at 1001. That proposed
amendment was apparently not incorporated into the final version. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 cmt. b (2010). Reporter Green believed that
the existing language adequately conveyed Wright's point. Id. at 35-37.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 12 cmt. b (2000).
Comment b states that notwithstanding its adoption (irrespective of what rule is applied for non-
intentional tortfeasors in the jurisdiction) of joint and several liability for intentional tortfeasors:
[Tihere . .. may be cases in which, although the defendant technically has committed an
intentional tort, the defendant's culpability is quite modest, for example a defendant who
committed a battery based on an unreasonable, yet honest, belief that the conduct was
privileged.... In such situations, courts may decide that such low-culpability intentional
tortfeasors should not be subject to the provisions of this Section and instead treated in
accordance with the rule for nonintentional tortfeasors in the jurisdiction.
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Battery is the most useful tort to illustrate the continuing ambiguity on
the nature of intent. Unfortunately, the relevant language of the Restatement
(Second), to which the new Restatement defers, is ambiguous on the
question that was not addressed by the new Restatement-precisely what
"consequences" must have been intended to support the tort of battery. The
core definition states that one is subject to liability for a battery if "he acts
intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other
or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and ... a
harmful contact with the person of the other . .. results."36 A similar
definition is used for batteries in which an "offensive contact" results.3 7 We
thus know that the resulting contact must have been either harmful or
offensive. Although we are afforded guidance on the nature of the
consequences that ultimately must have been suffered, we are not afforded
similar guidance on precisely what type of consequences must have been
intended, if any. The key language, "intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact" (or its apprehension) does not tell us whether a defendant
must have merely intended a contact (or its apprehension) that turns out to
be harmful or offensive, or must have also intended that its effect be harmful
or offensive.
Id. (emphasis added); cf id. § 1 Reporters' Note cmt. c (discussing special issues involving
intentional torts, taking no position on "whether a plaintiff's negligence is a comparative defense to
intentional torts," and referring to "when a defendant who otherwise batters a plaintiff honestly but
unreasonably believes the conduct was privileged or that it was not harmful or offensive (such as
when a defendant intentionally exposes a plaintiff to a pollutant that the defendant honestly but
unreasonably believes is not harmful")).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 16 (1965). Occasionally, a suggestion is made
that intent to engage in unlawful conduct, at least when likely to injure someone, may take the place
of intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact and support liability for a harmful or offensive
contact. See Lopez v. Surchia, 246 P.2d 111, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) (quoting the lower court with
approval that "'if the defendant did an illegal act which was likely to prove injurious to another, he is
answerable for the consequence which directly and naturally resulted from the conduct, even though
he did not intend to do the particular injury which followed,"' and "'[s]ince the court found, in the
case at bar, that the defendant was acting unlawfully and not in justifiable self-defense, the intent to
commit the injury is presumed"'); DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note I1, § 30 at 60 (discussing
the "unlawfulness" basis); Lawson, supra note I1, at 366-68. To the extent that a court viewed that
as a sufficient substitute for intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, the same issue might
arise. Namely, for the purposes of a battery, should it be required that the defendant have been
aware of the unlawfulness of his conduct, or merely that he have engaged in conduct that turns out to
have been unlawful?
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18, 20 (1965). Both sets of provisions also contain a
transferred intent provision. See id. §§ 13(a), 16(2), 18(a), 20(2).
38. And, with respect to claims based on allegedly offensive contacts, the Restatement states that
"[a] bodily contact is offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity." Id. § 19. It adds
that "it must be one which would offend the ordinary person and as such one not unduly sensitive as
to his personal dignity. It must, therefore, be a contact which is unwarranted by the social usages
prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted." Id. § 19 cmt. a.
39. The Restatement speaks in terms of "intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact .... ." Id. at
H 13, 18. For the sake of simplicity, this Article shall sometimes simply refer to "the contact" in
discussing the issues. Of course, to the extent that the commentators or cases would rely on the full
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Comments in the Restatement (Second) offer a few hints, but they are
far from a definitive answer.40 They state: "If an act is done with the
intention described in this Section, it is immaterial that the actor is not
inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or a desire to injure him., 4 1
Such language might be read as suggesting that the defendant need not have
intended a harmful or offensive effect to be liable, only the contact. But it is
not definitive. Even if hostility or a desire to injure is not necessarily
required, might intent at least to cause an offensive effect still be required (in
other words, one or the other of harm or offense), thus making the preceding
language inconclusive and not necessarily irreconcilable with a dual intent
rule? Other language points more strongly to a single intent rule.42  Thus,
the comment elaborates on the preceding language, stating that:
[T]he fact that the defendant who intentionally inflicts bodily harm
upon another does so as a practical joke, does not render him
immune from liability so long as the other has not consented. This
is true although the actor erroneously believes that the other will
regard it as a joke, or that the other has, in fact, consented to it. 43
This language arguably points to a mere intent to cause contact (single
intent) rule." However, language elsewhere in the Second Restatement
arguably could be read as suggesting a dual intent requirement, although it is
too vague and general to be definitive.45
Restatement formulation, one would have to articulate the issues and intent rules in terms of the
contact or its apprehension. See the proposed elements in Part III(A), infra.
40. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965).
42. See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965); cf id. § 18 cmt. c (discussing the
meaning of "contact," and stating that "[a]ll that is necessary is that the actor intend to cause the
other ... to come in contact with a foreign substance ... which the other will reasonably regard as
offensive"); id. § 34 (stating that, in connection with assault, "it is not necessary that the actor be
inspired by personal hostility or desire to offend").
44. See Simons, supra note I1, at 1067 n.17.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 2, intro. note (1965) ("The interest in freedom
from a bodily contact which causes no tangible harm but is merely offensive to a reasonable sense of
personal dignity is, on the other hand, protected only against acts which are intended to invade it or
to invade some other interest of personality of the person who is touched or of a third person.");
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. c (1979) (stating that a defendant's "own mistake
may indeed prevent his conduct from amounting to an intentional tort, as when there is no
knowledge that a touching will be harmful"). The section 892B comment offers less than
overwhelming support for the requirement that a defendant intend that the effect of the contact be
harmful or offensive. Id. That section deals with when a plaintiff's mistake may nullify consent. Id.
And in any event, this language does not address whether in the absence of intent that the contact be
harmful, it is still required that the defendant have intended that the contact be offensive.
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The relevant language from the Second Restatement was itself largely a
repackaging of the corresponding language from the First Restatement.46
The First Restatement addressed the intent requirement for battery, saying
that the actor is liable for a battery if, inter alia, "the act is done with the
intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an
apprehension thereof to the other or a third person."4 7 Like the subsequent
Restatement Second, this formulation is similarly ambiguous. The language,
"intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an
apprehension thereof to the other," does not indicate whether a defendant
must merely have intended a contact that turns out to be harmful or
offensive, or must in addition also have intended that the effect be harmful
or offensive. The sparse comments are also ambivalent and unrevealing,
although perhaps suggesting a mere intent to contact (single intent) rule.48
B. Cases and Commentators
It is not my purpose to enter the debate over which approach to the
intent question represents a majority view. As I will discuss, I believe such
exercises are often simplistic and largely futile. 49  Few cases discretely
engage the question in a thoughtful or unambiguous way. The authorities
46. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1934), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965). Dean Prosser, the Reporter for the Restatement (Second), in presenting a
tentative draft of the sections on intentional torts, said:
Tentative Draft No. I of the Second Restatement of Torts .. . represents the overhauling
of the first 165 sections of the Restatement. The Reporter and the group of advisors went
over that with a fine tooth comb, and found that the great bulk of those sections needed
no changes or, at the most, minor corrections in language which it was not worthwhile
bothering you with.
34 A.L.I. PROC. 280 (1957) (statement by William L. Prosser, Reporter); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS iii (1965).
47. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1934) (dealing with battery liability for resulting
harmful (under section 13) or offensive (under section 18) contacts).
48. Comment e says:
If an act is done with the intention described in this Section, it is immaterial that the actor
is not inspired by any personal hostility to or the desire to injure the other. Thus, the fact
that the defendant who intentionally inflicts bodily harm upon another does so as a
practical joke, does not render him immune from liability so long as the other has not
consented thereto.
Id. § 13 cmt. e. This language might be read as suggesting that mere intent to contact is enough, but
it is inconclusive. See supra text accompanying note 41. Another comment does seem to imply
more strongly that mere intent to contact is enough. It states that one may be liable "if he throws a
substance, such as water, upon the other," and that "[a]ll that is necessary is that the actor intend to
cause the other, directly or indirectly, to come in contact with a foreign substance in a manner which
the other will reasonably regard as offensive." Id § 18 cmt. d. On the other hand, the Introductory
Note to the chapter might arguably suggest that the defendant must also have intended "to invade"
one's interest in freedom from contact or of personality, although again, it is not definitive. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 2, intro. note (1935).
49. See infra Part IV(B)(2)(b).
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disagree5o on what consequence must have been intended for a battery, both
in terms of which view is the prevailing approach and on which approach
should be preferred. Some commentators suggest that the majority or
prevailing battery rule merely requires that the defendant have intended the
contact that turns out to be harmful or offensive but does not require that the
defendant have intended that the effect of that contact be harmful or
offensive." Most of those commentators also seem to favor that approach.5 2
50. The fact that the matter has been addressed by a number of thoughtful commentators,
including two who appear to take differing positions, attests to the worthiness of the inquiry.
Professor Kenneth Simons has recognized the question as one of the "intriguing legal developments"
in intentional tort law, and he supports a single intent approach. See Simons, supra note 11, at 1062,
1067 (preferring the mere intent to contact ("single intent") rule). Professors Dan Dobbs and Paul
Hayden (and co-authors when applicable) have addressed the question in their leading treatises, have
incorporated a useful case and some commentary on the matter into their casebook and
accompanying teacher's manual, and have opted for the dual intent rule. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 11, § 30, at 58-59; 1 DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, THE LAW OF TORTS-
PRACTITIONER TREATISE § 32, at 9-10 (Supp. 2009) [hereinafter DOBBS & HAYDEN, PRACTITIONER
TREATISE]; DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note 12, at 48-51 & n.2 (noting that
"[s]cholars have .. , disputed the point" and seeming to opt for the view "that the dual-intent rule is
better advised"); DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL TO TORTS AND COMPENSATION:
PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 35 (6th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL] (stating that "intent to touch without intent to
harm or offend should not be sufficient to establish a battery"). Dobbs et al. preferred the more
demanding dual intent rule. They also sought to narrow the difference between the two rules by
suggesting that the dual intent rule would itself operate broadly if the actor were deemed to intend to
offend when he knows "the touching is not consented to, since intent to engage in unconsented-to
conduct will always count as offense." DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra, at 35; see also
DOBBS & HAYDEN, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra at 9-10 (stating that "the absence of apparent
consent is itself the marker of offense, and the physician who knows he exceeds consent has intent to
offend by touchings the patient did not consent to").
51. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 25, at 36-37 (stating that the "intent required is only the intent
to bring about such a contact," and "[t]he defendant may be liable although he ... honestly believed
that he would not injure the plaintiff, or even where he was seeking the plaintiffs own good," or
"where he has intended . . . even a compliment . . . or a misguided effort is made to render
assistance"); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 24, at 1135 & n.10 ("[A]n actor may commit an
intentional tort without intending any harm whatsoever. . . . [W]hen A intentionally touches B in a
manner that a reasonable person would find offensive, A commits an offensive battery on B even if
A intends no harm, including offense."); Reynolds, supra note 11, at 718, 722, 725 (stating that the
"clear majority" rule is that "intent to harm or offend is not necessary to the tort of battery," and that
"[t]here must simply be intent ... to cause contact, followed by contact that in fact is either harmful
or reasonably offensive"); Simons, supra note 11, at 1066-67 (stating that the approach "requiring
only an intent to contact" is "the only plausible interpretation of the case law in this area").
52. See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 25, at 36-37 (implying that the intent to contact is sufficient
because of the interest in protecting personal dignity "according to the usages of decent society");
Reynolds, supra note 11, at 718, 722, 725, 731 (preferring this approach because "[g]enuinely
harmed plaintiffs should not suffer because of artificial and rigid lines that would exclude from
recovery those harmed by pranks, medical mistakes, or situations of mistaken identity"); Simons,
supra note 11, at 1066-67 (stating that the approach "requiring only an intent to contact" is "much
more defensible and indeed is the only plausible interpretation of the case law in this area").
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Other commentators suggest that the prevailing53 (or at least preferred5 4)
rule requires both that the defendant have intended the contact and that the
defendant have intended for that contact to harm or offend the plaintiff. Still
other commentators seem to prefer some other rule or variation.ss Moreover,
notwithstanding the Second Restatement's ambiguity, some commentators
believe that the Second Restatement seems to favor one view over the
other. 56 The language of some cases seems to support the view that the
53. See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 34 (endorsing the view that
"the so-called 'dual intent' rule is the one followed by most states"); Lawson, supra note 11, at 356-
57, 382 (stating that "[tihe traditional rule requires the plaintiff to prove that he was harmed or
offended by contact, and that the defendant intended this harm or offense," although he also says that
an "intentional unauthorized contact" rule is "implied in the current law"); see also White v. Muniz,
999 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. 2000) (stating that "courts and legal commentators generally agree that an
intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor intended harm or offense").
54. See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note 12, at 48-51 & n.2 (noting
that "[s]cholars have ... disputed the point" and seeming to opt for the view "that the dual-intent
rule is better advised"); DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 34-35 (stating that
the authors do not read the cases as supporting the mere intent to contact rule, that the "dual intent"
rule is followed by most states, and that the latter is preferred on policy grounds).
55. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11, at 384. Professor Lawson has proposed a "hybrid"
variation, making one subject to battery liability: "(a) if the plaintiff proves that the defendant
intentionally caused a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiffs person and the defendant fails
to prove that the plaintiff effectively consented . . . or (b) if the plaintiff proves that the defendant
intentionally caused an unauthorized contact with the plaintiffs person." Id. I agree with the
general direction of Lawson's proposal. I nevertheless have some concerns. The language of clause
(a) is similar to the language of the Restatement: that a defendant must have intended "to cause a
harmful or offensive contact." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965). But, the
Restatement language is itself ambiguous- that is the problem. Perhaps Lawson means for the
clause (a) language to require intent to harm or offend (unless the defendant proves consent).
Lawson, supra note 11, at 384-85. Lawson places the burden to prove the absence of consent on the
defendant under the (a) option. Id. at 384. I prefer, however, to keep the intent and absence of
consent elements separate (except to the extent that awareness of the absence of consent may be
relevant to the intent element) and to keep the burden on the plaintiff to prove both elements. See
infra note 82 and accompanying text. Lawson's clause (b) alternative, Lawson, supra note 11, at
384, may impose too broad a liability in that it might be construed to impose liability when a
defendant knew there was no consent, even if he were unaware of the essential harmful or offensive
nature of the contact in the absence of consent and honestly believed the contact would not be
offensive, and was unaware that individualized consent was required. Clause (b) is also unclear on
when a defendant must have known of the absence of consent. Perhaps the language that I propose
will obviate some of these concerns, while also taking a multi-alternative approach to intent with
dual intent and awareness of the lack of consent options. See infra Part III.
56. Compare Henderson & Twerski, supra note 24, at 1135 n.10 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 18-19 (1965) as support for recognizing potential battery "even if [the actor]
intends no harm, including offense"), with DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note I1, at 59 (stating
that the Restatement's formula "probably means intent to harm or offend as well as an intent to touch
is required"), and Lawson, supra note 11, at 357, 366 (citing the Restatement for the dual intent
rule). Henderson & Twerski seem to support their view by pointing to the fact that "[t]he proper test
for offensive contact is completely objective-'a contact which is unwarranted by the social usages
prevalent at the time and place at which it is inflicted.' In effect, A is held strictly liable for having
acted in ignorance of prevalent social usages." Henderson & Twerski, supra note 24, at 1135 n.10
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 cmt. a (1965)). But, their reliance on and
interpretation of section 19 is misplaced. That section addresses only the nature of the consequence
that must result; it does not tell us the nature of the consequence that must have been intended.
Dobbs states that his reading is "in line with the fault principle and also with the freedom to act
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defendant must have intended the contact but need not have intended to
harm or offend. 1 Language in other cases suggests that the defendant must
have intended both the contact and intend that its effect be harmful or
offensive.58
encouraged by that principle." DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 59. While his reading
may be consistent with the policy objectives he invokes, that rationale is not explicit in the relevant
Restatement language, and the comments are ambiguous or divergent. See supra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text.
57. See Fuerschbach v. Southwest Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006)
(reversing in part a case arising out of an alleged mock arrest prank in which the district court had
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because the district court found "that the
officers did not intend to cause an offensive contact," and on appeal suggesting generally that an
intentional tortfeasor may be held liable "notwithstanding the characterization of the tort as a prank,
or even a good faith but incorrect belief that the tort victim will enjoy the joke"); Rogers v. Loews
L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 529 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating that of primary importance "is
the absence of consent . .. rather than the hostile intent of the defendant," and that although intent is
required, it "is only the intent 'to bring about such a contact"'); White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d
108, 109, 111 (Idaho 1990) (the intent required for battery "does not mean that the person has to
intend that the contact be harmful or offensive" and "is satisfied if the actor's affirmative act causes
an intended contact which is unpermitted and which is harmful or offensive"); Brenneman v.
Famous Dave's of Am., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 828, 846 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (relying on Iowa jury
instruction that "[a] battery is committed when a person intentionally does ... [a]n act resulting in
bodily contact causing physical pain or injury [or] . . . [a]n act resulting in bodily contact which a
reasonable person would deem insulting or offensive," but also citing trial court language in the case
of Bechen v. Francis, No. 02-1183, 2003 WL 21464649, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 25, 2003) that
seems to point in another direction); Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 657 (Ky. 2000) (stating that
"while intent is an essential element of battery, it refers to the consequences of an act, i.e. the
contact," adding that "it is an intent to make contact with the person"); Taylor v. Univ. Med. Ctr.,
Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03CV-502-H, 2005 WL 1026190, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 26, 2005) ("To prevail
on a claim of common law battery, [plaintiff] must prove intentional contact of a harmful nature.");
Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1951)
(stating in case in which the plaintiff had fractured her arm at the defendant's skating rink and the
defendant's employee allegedly continued to attempt to manipulate the plaintiffs arm despite her
protestations that "[a]lthough his acts may have been performed with the best of intentions ... the
jury might well have found that [the employee's] conduct constituted an assault and battery"); Frey
v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864, 868 (S.D. 1992) (battery required that the defendant act with either design
or with substantial certainty "that bodily contact with [the plaintiff] would occur-that [the plaintiff]
would be struck with the glass," and noting that intent "'is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire
to do any harm,"' and adding somewhat ambiguously that "'it is an intent to bring about a result
which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids' (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984)); Wagner v. Utah, 122 P.3d
599, 603-04 (Utah 2005) ("We hold that the actor need not intend that his contact be harmful or
offensive in order to commit a battery so long as he deliberately made the contact and so long as that
contact satisfies our legal test for what is harmful or offensive."); J.W. v. Utah, No. 2:05CV00968K,
2006 WL 1049112, at *5 (D. Utah Apr. 19, 2006) (stating in connection with alleged conduct
"committed by a mentally-handicapped child under the age of seven" that all that is required for a
battery is that the contact was deliberately initiated); Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Wash.
1955) (holding that if it were established that defendant, nearly six, caused plaintiff to fall
purposefully or knew to a substantial certainty that when he moved the chair she would attempt to sit
where it had been, then the mere absence of intent to injure, play a prank on, embarrass, or commit a
battery on the plaintiff would not absolve the defendant from battery liability).
58. See Witt v. Condos. at Boulders Ass'n, No. 04-cv-02000, 2007 WL 840509, at *5 (D. Colo.
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The question of the nature of the intent required for battery may warrant
a somewhat different formulation of the issue in some cases in which the
plaintiff's focus is on the absence of consent. The most common cases arise
in the context of medical procedures administered in the absence of consent,
raising the question of whether a defendant's awareness of his lack of
consent is required for intent. As a general matter, a health care provider
may, absent an applicable exception for an emergency,59 be subject to
potential liability for a battery60 for performing a medical procedure to
which the patient did not consent, or for deviating from or going beyond the
scope of the treatment or procedure contemplated by the patient's consent.
Thus, at least if it were proven that a health care provider were aware of the
March 19, 2007) (stating that "[t]he intent element applies to both the intent to cause the contact, and
the intent that the Plaintiff will find the contact to be harmful or offensive"); Austin B. v. Escondido
Union Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 464 (Ct. App. 2007) (stating that, at least when a touching is
not unlawful, "in the ordinary case ... to be liable for battery, a defendant must intend to harm or
offend the victim"); White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 819 (Colo. 2000) (holding "that regardless of the
characteristics of the alleged tortfeasor, a plaintiff must prove that the actor desired to cause
offensive or harmful consequences by his act"); Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 608,
611 (Ind. 2007) (noting in a case involving an alleged harmful intubation by a student in an
emergency medical technician certification program in which the patient had allegedly indicated on
the consent form that she did not consent to the presence of healthcare learners, that because the
student had no reason to suspect that the patient had modified the consent form, she could rely on
anesthesiologist's alleged granting permission to attempt intubation, her experience attempting to
intubate a patient that day, and her preceptor's alleged direction, and, therefore, "[iln the absence of
any obligation . . . to obtain . . . independent, definitive knowledge of [the patient's] consent," she
was not liable for battery for merely attempting the intubation, and that there was no other basis for
her battery liability because there were no allegations or evidence that she "touched [the patient]
with the intent to cause harm"); cf Bechen v. Francis, No. 02-1183, 2003 WL 21464649, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. June 25, 2003) (affirming a verdict for the defendant after the trial court had instructed the
jury that plaintiff must prove that "[t]he striking was done with the intent to cause physical pain or
injury . .. or to be insulting or result in offensive contact," by which the trial court meant "with the
intent to cause physical pain or injury or to be insulting or offensive," but declining on procedural
grounds to decide the validity of the plaintiffs contention that the trial court should not have so
instructed the jury).
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D (1979).
60. This absence-of-consent battery paradigm should be distinguished from an "informed
consent" claim, in which the patient consented to the actual procedure, but alleges that the defendant
provided insufficient information regarding the risks and other material information requiring
disclosure. Most courts deem "informed consent" liability as a species of negligent malpractice
rather than a battery. I DAVID W. LOUISELL & HAROLD WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §
8.06[2] (2009) ("[M]ost courts today reserve the assault and battery theory for cases in which the
patient has not consented to the procedure actually performed, while using negligence as the basis
for claims that the provider obtained the patient's consent without making a proper disclosure.").
Notwithstanding the preceding distinction, even when plaintiff alleges a claim that if proven would
fall within the definition of a battery, courts may sometimes still have to address the issue of the
effect, if any, of a state's medical malpractice informed consent statute on claims that would
otherwise allegedly fall within the definition of battery. See, e.g., Christman v. Davis, 889 A.2d 746,
750-51 (Vt. 2005). That issue is beyond the scope of this article.
61. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 60, § 8.06[l] ("[Flailure to obtain consent subjects
the provider to liability for battery."); W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon
for Extending Operation or Treatment Beyond That Expressly Authorized, 56 A.L.R.2d 695, § 2
(1957) (referring to the rule that "ordinarily a physician who undertakes to treat another without
having obtained the patient's consent, express or implied, is guilty of at least a technical battery").
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absence of evident consent or consciously exceeded the scope of patient's
consent, the intent requirement would probably be deemed satisfied. This
leaves the question of what the element of intent requires. Does the intent
element require that the defendant have been aware of the absence of evident
consent? Or, assuming such consent was absent,62  may the intent
requirement be satisfied and the defendant be subject to battery liability even
when his alleged nonconsensual conduct or variance from the scope of the
consent was based on an unwitting mistake or lack of awareness of his
variance, and even though he honestly believed he had consent or was acting
within the scope of the consent? Not many cases have explicitly addressed
the question. In those that arguably have, the language appears divided 63
62. On what constitutes consent, see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1979)
(stating that "[c]onsent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur," and that "[i]f words or conduct
are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent consent and
are as effective as consent in fact").
63. Some cases suggest awareness is required. See, e.g., Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging,
Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 440 (Ariz. 2003) (remanding case, and stating "that when a patient gives limited
or conditional consent, a health care provider has committed a battery if the evidence shows the
provider acted with willful disregard of the consent given"); Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 865
N.E.2d 608, 611 (Ind. 2007) (noting in a case involving an alleged harmful intubation by a student in
an emergency medical technician certification program in which the patient had allegedly indicated
on the consent form that she did not consent to the presence of healthcare learners, that because the
student had no reason to suspect that the patient had modified the consent form, she could rely on
anesthesiologist's alleged granting permission to attempt intubation, her experience attempting to
intubate a patient that day, and her preceptor's alleged direction, and therefore "[iun the absence of
any obligation ... to obtain . . . independent, definitive knowledge of [the patient's] consent," she
was not liable for battery for merely attempting the intubation); Murphy v. Implicito, 920 A.2d 678,
686 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2007) (stating in connection with remand for retrial that "[w]hen a patient gives
limited or conditional consent, a doctor has committed a battery if the evidence shows that the doctor
acted with disregard of the consent given and thus exceeded its scope"); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 illus. 5 & cmt. d (2010)
(suggesting that doctor who mistakenly gives the patient the wrong medication was not liable for
battery because she was not substantially certain it would cause him harm); Lawson, supra note 11,
at 384 (supporting that view, and stating that "plaintiff will have to prove that defendant knew that
the plaintiff had not consented").
Language in other cases suggests that awareness is not required. See, e.g., Vitale v. Henchey,
24 S.W.3d 651, 657-58 (Ky. 2000) (adopting a mere intent to contact rule, and also stating that the
defendant-surgeon was not entitled to rely on ineffective consent allegedly given by persons without
authority to consent, thus implying that defendant-surgeon need not have realized that valid consent
was allegedly absent); see also Simons, supra note I1, at 1067, 1075-76 (opining that "in many
cases of medical treatment, doctors are found liable for battery for exceeding the scope of the
patient's consent, notwithstanding their belief that they have acted within the scope of consent," but
later perhaps equivocating by stating "if the patient explicitly imposes a condition upon his consent
and the doctor knowingly acts in violation of that condition, the doctor has committed a battery"
(emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965) ("[Ilt is immaterial that
the actor is not inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or a desire to injure him. . . . This is
true although the actor erroneously believes . . . that the other has, in fact, consented to [the
contact].").
Some cases seem to apply different rules depending on the type of facts alleged. See, e.g.,
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and offers little in the way of analysis.64
Consider a scenario in which a health care provider mistakenly removes
the wrong tissue or otherwise mistakenly goes beyond the scope of the
procedure contemplated by the patient's consent. Should the intent
requirement be satisfied? Here too the cases appear divided on the question
of whether the defendant must have been aware of his deviation from the
patient's consent. Some suggest awareness is required and thus seem to
reject the application of battery classification when the defendant's alleged
variance from the patient's consent was based on a mistake or lack of
awareness of the variance.65 Other cases suggest that defendants might be
Dennis v. Southard, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 561-62 (Ct. App. 2009) (when the plaintiff allegedly
"gave conditional consent to a medical procedure and ... it is alleged that the defendant proceeded
without the condition having been satisfied," the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew the
condition had not been satisfied; but suggesting that there is no separate knowledge requirement
"when it is alleged the defendant performed a medical procedure without the plaintiffs consent,"
and that the "law presumes that '[w]hen the patient gives permission to perform one type of
treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of deliberate intent to deviate from
the consent given is present' (quoting Piedra v. Dugan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 36, 48 (Ct. App. 2004))).
Sometimes the court is silent on the nature of the intent requirement in the medical context.
In Hernandez v. Schittek, 713 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999), it was agreed that if a breast biopsy
indicated malignancy the patient would undergo a quadrantectomy; if negative, the lump would be
excised; and "there was no discussion as to what would happen if the frozen section was
inconclusive." Id. at 208. The court concluded that based on the conversation between the parties,
the defendant's performance of the quadrantectomy in the absence of a biopsy indicating malignancy
was a substantial variance from the scope of the patient's consent. Id. at 207-08. Nevertheless, the
defendant contended that the surgical consent form should still be construed to include consent to
perform the quadrantectomy, an argument which the court rejected as inconsistent with the parties'
discussion and because the form "would not allow for that strained construction." Id at 208, 210.
The court did not mention whether awareness of the alleged variance from the patient's consent was
required, nor did it explicitly address what the defendant may actually have believed about the scope
of the patient's consent. It thus perhaps implied that the defendant's actual knowledge of his alleged
variance may not have been required, and that the defendant might still be subject to battery liability
irrespective of whether or not he honestly believed he was acting within the scope of the patient's
consent (including her written consent), if consent was absent.
64. See Lawson, supra note 11, at 356 (commenting that there has not been much "satisfactory
explanation of the defendant's tortious intent").
65. See, e.g., Bowers v. Lee, 577 S.E.2d 9, 10 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs theory
that a battery applied because she "did not consent to a sponge being left in her body," and noting
"that battery is an intentional tort" "[a]nd the record in the present case is devoid of any evidence
that [any health care providers] intentionally left the sponge in [the patient's] body"), overruled on
other grounds by Mateen v. Dicus, 637 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. 2006); Hershey v. Peake, 223 P. 1113,
1114-15 (Kan. 1924) (holding, in a case in which the defendant-dentist allegedly mistakenly pulled
teeth on the right side rather than the left side "which last-mentioned teeth the defendant stated he
would pull and which plaintiff consented for the defendant to pull," that "the petition states a cause
of action for negligence or malpractice rather than one for assault and battery"); Woolley v.
Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Me. 1980) (holding, in a case in which the plaintiff alleged that
during surgery for a ruptured disc the defendant-surgeon performed a laminectomy and
foraminotomy at the wrong interspace, and in which defendant sought to explain the error,
contending that because a congenital abnormality of the spine made "counting and ascertaining the
vertebral levels difficult," he performed the surgical procedures at "L 3, 4 rather than at L 4, 5," that
"plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant operated at the wrong lumbar interspace does not come
within the narrow area in which physicians remain liable for battery," that plaintiff "authorized the
defendant to operate on her lumbar vertebrae" and "defendant did not perform this surgery against
640
[Vol. 38: 623, 2011] The Torts Restatement's Inchoate Definition
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
subject to battery liability for allegedly exceeding a patient's consent even if
the defendant was not aware that he was doing so and mistakenly believed
that he was performing within the scope of the patient's consent.66
Generalization is difficult because the state of the law on this question is not
very clear, 7 and neither are the cases that ostensibly address the question.
the will of the plaintiff," "[n]or did the defendant perform an operation which he knew was
substantially different from that to which the plaintiff had consented," and thus did not constitute
"such egregious circumstances, the conscious disregard of the patient's interest in his physical
integrity," so as to carry "the physician's conduct outside of the physician-patient relationship" and
subject him to battery liability). The court in Bowers worried that the plaintiffs "theory would
transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim, allowing the plaintiff to allege he or
she did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure." Bowers, 577 S.E.2d at
10; accord Morton v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 653 S.E.2d 756, 757 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
the preceding language from Bowers with approval).
66. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Mamelak, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861, 868 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding, in a case
in which the surgeon allegedly twice mistakenly operated on the wrong disc, that defendant would
be subject to battery liability if the jury concludes that operating on wrong disc is not one of the
"complications inherent to the procedure," but rather "operating on the wrong disk within inches of
the correct disk is a 'substantially different procedure'); Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F. Supp. 833, 840
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (stating in a case in which the plaintiff alleged "thle] defendant pulled the wrong
tooth . . . and that the tooth causing the problems that led to that visit was adjacent to the tooth that
was pulled," that "if defendant removed the wrong tooth, he may have committed an assault and
battery"); Sood v. Smeigh, 578 S.E.2d 158, 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (allegation that surgeon
installed and re-assembled the prosthetic patella in a backward position during total knee
replacement "would constitute an unconsented-to battery;" but compare to other Georgia cases supra
in note 65); Gaskin v. Goldwasser, 520 N.E.2d 1085, 1089, 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding, in
case in which defendant allegedly "did not review the plaintiffs charts prior to the surgery" and
"[a]s a result ... five teeth were extracted without the plaintiffs consent" and in which defendant
allegedly "was first made aware of his mistake when the patient returned to his office on the day
after surgery," that if it were proven on remand that the defendant removed five teeth in addition to
the fourteen to which plaintiff had consented, that there would be "sufficient evidence to support a
battery theory of recovery"). For another Califoria case applying a different rule in a different type
of scenario, see generally Dennis, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561-62.
67. See supra notes 65-66 (contrasting holdings in Sood and Bowers); see also Morton, 653
S.E.2d at 757 (quoting both Sood and Bowers with approval). Compare, e.g., Sood, 578 S.E.2d at
163, with Bowers, 577 S.E.2d at 10. See generally Shipley, supra note 61, at section 5 (stating that
"[w]here the surgeon engaged to operate on a particular organ performs the operation on another and
sound part of the body by mistake, it seems clear that he should be held liable, at least where the
mistake is the result of his own fault or negligence," but failing to clearly delineate whether there is a
prevailing rule that specifies whether the defendants are subject to liability for battery).
68. In Washburn v. Klara, 561 S.E.2d 682 (Va. 2002), for example, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant-surgeon "exceeded the scope of her consent by performing a cervical diskectomy at the
C7-T1 level . . . in addition to the diskectomy at the C6-7 level to which [the plaintiff] had
consented." Id. at 686. The defendant-surgeon not only argued that "he operated only at the C6-7
level" but also that plaintiff "failed to establish a prima facie case of battery because there was no
evidence that he intentionally exceeded the scope of . .. consent," because even "if a fusion of [the
plaintiff's] vertebrae at the C7-TI level occurred ... it resulted from his negligence or lack of skill
and not because he intentionally operated at that level," and thus "that he did not commit a battery."
Id. (emphasis added). In remanding for a new trial on the claim of battery, the court held that the
evidence "was sufficient to present a factual issue . . . whether Dr. Borden intentionally performed a
cervical diskectomy at two levels of Washburn's spine, thus exceeding the scope of her consent."
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C The Institute's Rationale for Deferral
The Institute's decision to defer addressing fully the concept of intent in
battery is perhaps understandable because it would presumably have delayed
completion of the other important sections of the latest project. However,
the Institute's expressed rationale for not fully addressing in the present
project the intent element for traditional intentional torts to the person, such
as battery, is not convincing. A comment in an earlier draft version reasoned
that "[a]lthough the intentional infliction of physical harm is ... common in
society,... litigation resulting from that harm is relatively uncommon."69
The comment added that since the Restatement (Second) of Torts addressed
battery in 1965, "there have been only a limited number of judicial opinions
applying the physical-harm intentional-tort doctrines in that Restatement;
and there is a scarcity of judicial opinions that have seriously called into
question any of those doctrines." 70 But as I have discussed, there remains an
ambiguity and, as near as one can tell from the opinions, a pronounced
division of authority on the nature of the consequence that must have been
intended.
The relevant language of the Second Restatement remains ambiguous
and incomplete regarding the nature of intent for the purposes of battery.
This ambiguity should not be perpetuated as "authoritative',71 until the
matter is addressed in a future project. One of the primary reasons for the
restatements is to clarify the law and relieve uncertainty. Even if there were
truly a dearth of case law, at the very least, the issue should have been
clearly addressed in the comments. 72  But, in point of fact, there have been
Id. (emphasis added). The problem with the court's language is that it does not clarify what it means
by "intentionally." Is mere intent to perform the diskectomy where it ultimately occurred sufficient
even if the doctor was mistaken about precisely where that was, if it turns out to be beyond the scope
of consent? Or, must the defendant have also realized as he performed that what he was allegedly
doing was extending the fusion beyond the scope of the patient's consent? For more on the court's
thinking, see Woodbury v. Courtney, 391 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Va. 1990), cited by the court.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 5 cmt. c (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
70. Id; see also The American Law Institute Seventy-Eighth Annual Meeting, supra note 34, at
58 (2001) (quoting Michael D. Green, Reporter from 2000 for the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, stating that his predecessor, Gary Schwartz, "looked at
those specific intentional torts and the level of cases that have developed since 1974, didn't feel that
any further refinement was necessary, and so there is just this one broad statement about
intentionally caused harm in this Restatement"). At least one commentator has supported the
decision to not revise the intentional torts materials in the latest project. See Simons, supra note 11,
at 1062, 1079 (stating that "[a] new Restatement (Third) of Intentional Torts project should not be
highest on the agenda of the ALI," even though "the various confusions and uncertainties in battery
doctrine could usefully be clarified by a new Restatement," because "these confusions ... are not
sufficiently substantial or widespread to suggest a compelling and immediate need for a Restatement
(Third) of Intentional Torts").
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 5 cmt. a
(2009).
72. John W. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to Its Increasingly Advantageous
Quality, and an Encouragement to Continue the Trend, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 59, 76 (1985) [hereinafter
642
[Vol. 38: 623, 2011] The Torts Restatement's Inchoate Definition
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
relevant cases, including some since the Second Restatement. As I have
discussed, there remains an ambiguity, and the commentators and cases (as
near as one can tell from the opinions) have seemingly endorsed conflicting
views on the nature of the consequence that must have been intended.
The Reporters' Note to a prior draft version also offered the following
reassurance regarding the drafters' decision to defer elaboration on the full
nature of the intent element for battery: "It is possible that intentional-tort
doctrine-then and now-limits the amount of litigation necessary to
resolve claims because it is so clear as to encourage the filing of meritorious
claims yet prevent the need for subsequent appeals."73 Unfortunately, that
statement is not only unfounded speculation, but it appears to misconceive
the dynamics of personal injury litigation. That one believes the impact on
future litigation will not be significant is no justification for indulging, at
least for a time (perhaps a long time), the continuing ambiguity of the
Restatement on the full meaning of intent. Ambiguity attracts litigation. It
is a function of what Robert Cover called the "agonistic character of law,"7 4
the tendency for attorneys and litigants to "search for and exploit any part of
the structure that may work to their advantage."" The danger is that the
opening created by the current and persisting ambiguity and uncertainty will
morph into a dangerous tripwire rule of liability.
I believe that it would have been preferable if the Restatement (Third)
had not deferred to the Restatement (Second) on the details of battery and
similar torts,76 but instead pressed ahead in the latest project to complete and
perfect its definition of intent. It is hoped that the restatement will soon
undertake to address and resolve the question of whether liability for battery
requires that the defendant have not only intended the contact, but also have
intended that such contact be harmful or offensive.
In the next section, I will briefly discuss the direction that the
restatement might take when the Institute explicitly revisits the question of
Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute] ("If the topic has not been important enough to become
the subject of litigation, it may perhaps be ignored. It may, however, be sufficiently important and
likely enough to arise that something should be said about it. The statement would then be likely to
be in the Comments rather than the Blackletter.").
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 5, Reporters' Note cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
74. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1623 (1986); see also Arthur
Allen Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989, 1003-04, 1009 (1978) (discussing the metaphor of the law
and the trial as an "agonistic game").
75. Cover, supra note 74, at 1623.
76. Although I have only discussed battery in this Article, I also believe that the Institute should
likewise clarify the intent element for the companion torts of assault and false imprisonment, which
raise similar questions about the consequence that must have been intended in order for the resulting
apprehension or restraint, respectively, to be actionable.
643
intent for battery in a more comprehensive way. My purpose is not to
undertake a state-by-state survey or analysis of the details and nuances of the
case law addressing the intent question. Rather, I will simply offer a
tentative formulation to merely facilitate dialogue on the question and to
serve as another model that the courts and, hopefully, the Institute may
consider.
III. FORMULATING THE INTENT ELEMENT FOR BATTERY
A. Proposed Formulation
I offer here a tentative formulation on the nature of the intended
consequences required for a battery. I believe that intent to contact should
not alone be sufficient for the purposes of the intent requirement. Rather, a
more restrictive liability rule for intent seems preferable, one that is a
variation of the dual intent requirement. For purposes of the intent
requirement, in addition to proving that the defendant intended the contact,
the plaintiff should also have to prove either: (1) that the defendant
entertained a purpose or knew to a substantial certainty that the contact or its
apprehension would be harmful or offensive, or alternatively, (2) that
immediately prior to initiating the contact, the defendant both (a) knew that
valid consent was required or that in its absence the contact or its
apprehension would be of a harmful or offensive character, and (b) either (i)
was aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the absence of or deviation
from the reasonably evident consent" of the contemplated recipient of the
contact (meaning aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the absence of
or his own lack of knowledge of information that a reasonable person would
understand as establishing the existence of consent of the contemplated
recipient of the contact, or aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the
existence of information a reasonable person would understand as being
inconsistent with the consent of the contemplated recipient of the contact),
or (ii) did not honestly believe that he had valid consent of the contemplated
recipient of the contact. 8  The elements of battery with my proposed
77. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra note 50 § 32, at 9-10 (referring to
"the absence of apparent consent"). It should also be sufficient to satisfy this element that the
defendant was aware that an otherwise sufficient manifestation of consent was invalid. With respect
to the separate element of the absence of consent, the scope of potentially invalidating factors, and
the question for the purposes of that element of what (or whether any) level of awareness or
knowledge by a defendant of the alleged invalidating conditions or circumstances is required to
invalidate consent is beyond the scope of this article, and will not be addressed here. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 892, 892A(2)(a), 892B (1979) (identifying requirements for
effective consent and potentially invalidating grounds).
78. Cf DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION, supra note 12, at 48-51 & n.2 (favoring the
dual intent rule); DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 35 (suggesting that intent
would also be found when defendant knows "the touching is not consented to"); DOBBS & HAYDEN,
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formulation incorporated would require the plaintiff to prove each of the
following:
First: That the defendant engaged in volitional conduct;
Second: That the defendant entertained a purpose or knew to a
substantial certainty that the contact or its apprehension would result to the
plaintiff (or to the person from whom intent was transferred 9);
Third: Either: (1) that the defendant entertained a purpose or knew to a
substantial certainty that the contact or its apprehension would be harmful or
offensive, or alternatively, (2) that immediately prior to initiating the
contact, the defendant both (a) knew that valid consent was required or that
in its absence the contact or its apprehension would be of a harmful or
offensive character, and (b) either (i) was aware and contemporaneously
cognizant of the absence of or deviation from the reasonably evident
consento of the contemplated recipient of the contact (meaning aware and
contemporaneously cognizant of the absence of or his own lack of
knowledge of information that a reasonable person would understand as
establishing the existence of consent of the contemplated recipient of the
contact, or aware and contemporaneously cognizant of the existence of
information a reasonable person would understand as being inconsistent with
the consent of the contemplated recipient of the contact), or (ii) did not
honestly believe that he had valid consent of the contemplated recipient of
the contact;8 '
Fourth: That the conduct caused a harmful or offensive contact;
Fifth: That there was an absence of valid consent;82 and
PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra note 50, § 32, at 9-10 (stating that "the absence of apparent consent
is itself the marker of offense, and the physician who knows he exceeds consent has intent to offend
by touchings the patient did not consent to"); Lawson, supra note 11, at 384-85 (suggesting a two
option variation which I believe represents a step in the right direction); supra note 50 (discussing
the view of Dobbs et al.); supra note 55 (discussing Professor Lawson's view). Professor Simons
criticizes this view because "it fails to impose liability on the actor who honestly but unreasonably
believes he has the victim's consent." Simons, supra note I1, at 1070 n.27 (criticizing the Lawson
view). But, that would not be true if awareness of the absence of reasonably evident consent were
sufficient, as it would be under my proposed formulation, to satisfy the intent requirement. See
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 59 (stating in the context of intent that the "plaintiffs
apparent lack of consent must be judged objectively"); DOBBS & HAYDEN, PRACTITIONER TREATISE,
supra note 50.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13(a), 16(2), 18(a), 20(2) (1965).
80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
81. Determining the defendant's state of mind and awareness should be based upon all of the
relevant evidence, and not merely upon what the defendant professes to have known or remembered.
See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
82. On what constitutes consent, see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892 cmts. b, c
(1979) (stating that "[c]onsent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur," and that "if words or
conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent
consent and are as effective as consent in fact;" and thus explaining that consent means either that
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Sixth: That such contact was impermissible or unwarranted under the
circumstances. 83
Under my proposed formulation, intent can be established not only
when a defendant intended to harm or offend, but also when a defendant
knew that consent was required (or knew of the harmful or offensive
character of such contacts in the absence of consent) and was aware of the
absence of evident consent (or did not believe he had consent).
Conceptually, intent alternative (2) in the Third element above could be
the plaintiff "is in fact willing for the conduct to occur," or when his conduct "would be understood
by a reasonable person as intended to indicate consent and they are in fact so understood" by the
defendant); id. § 892D (addressing an emergency action without consent). I have treated the absence
of consent as an element. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. c (1965) (stating with
respect to "invasions of the interests of personality," that "the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove
absence of consent"). For emergency situations, see generally id § 13 cmt. d ("[T]he absence of
consent is a matter essential to the cause of action, and it is uniformly held that it must be proved by
the plaintiff as a necessary part of his case."); see also, e.g., Costanzo v. Gray, 963 A.2d 1039, 1048
n.9 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009) (stating that for an alleged battery claim, "[o]rdinarily, it is the plaintiff's
burden to prove lack of consent"); Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 658 (Ky. 2000) ("Lack of
consent is an essential element of battery. Therefore, the absence of consent must be proved as a
necessary part of the plaintiffs case."). There does appear, however, to be some disagreement on
whether the absence of consent is an element or whether consent is a defense. See Studnicka v.
Pinheiro, No. 05-723, 2008 WL 611605, at *3 n.l (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2008) (not resolving the
question), aff'd No. 09-1702, 2010 WL 3325601 (8th Cir. 2010); Jack K. Levin, 6 AM. JUR. 2d
Assault and Battery §§ 7, 116 (database updated Apr. 2010) ("Consent is a defense to civil actions
for assault or battery, or lack of consent is considered an element of battery.").
Although this element might be largely subsumed into the Third element, that would not
always be so. It might be discovered after the contact that, despite appearances to the contrary, the
plaintiff had been willing prior to the contact. Liability should be precluded because there was
actual willingness, consent in fact. See § 892 cmt. b & illus. 1.
83. By impermissible or unwarranted, I mean that, absent consent, society deems contacts with
the features of the contact that the defendant intended unacceptable. This requirement may be
largely redundant, considering that situations satisfying the Third element would usually almost by
definition be impermissible. Also, it may be largely addressed by the Restatement (Second)
definition of "offensive" contact as "one which would offend the ordinary person and ... one not
unduly sensitive as to his personal dignity." Id. § 19 cmt. a. Note, however, that section 19 contains
a caveat as to whether a defendant may be liable if he knows a contact "will be offensive to
another's known but abnormally acute sense of personal dignity." Id. I have included the Sixth
element to help address that potential rare situation in which a defendant knows that an intentional
contact will be offensive, but his conduct might still be deemed permissible. Say, for example, that
the defendant is aware that the plaintiff suffers from claustrophobia, but the defendant nevertheless
chooses to sit next to and in physical contact with the plaintiff in the only vacant seat on a crowded
subway, rather than to stand. That contact should probably not be actionable as battery. See DOBBS,
THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note I1, § 29, at 56 ("Suppose ... the subway rider makes it plain to all
passengers that she must not be touched by others as they attempt to exit the crowded car. Would
other riders be liable for a battery if they must push though the throng to reach the exit? Presumably
not. Not only are such jostlings socially accepted, they are necessary to protect the rights of others
who must also live in an unpleasantly crowded world. The plaintiffs right to avoid bodily contact is
important, but so is the defendant's right to take the subway and get to work. The plaintiff cannot
preempt the subway space for herself alone."). Perhaps a different conclusion would arguably be
warranted if the subway had other available seats, and the defendant still chose to sit next to the
plaintiff. See id at 57 ("When the entitlement of others disappears, as where the subways car is not
crowded, the plaintiff is free to insist that she not be touched even if many others would not object to
an unnecessary jostle.").
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presented in two ways. One way would be to treat it as a corollary to
alternative (1). We would simply reason that an intentional contact with
the state of mind contemplated in (2) would be deemed an intent to harm
or at least offend. 84 Or, we could give separate billing to alternative (2).85
I have listed (2) as a separate alternative for the sake of salience and
clarity.
B. Formulation as Applied
To briefly illustrate the preceding formulation, let us consider a battery
claim against a hypothetical dental surgeon. Assume that the trier of fact
determined that our dental surgeon removed a left molar instead of the
right molar, the one to which the patient had consented. Assume further
that the dental surgeon removed the wrong tooth by mistake and that he
did not realize he was deviating from the patient's consent. Our dental
surgeon did not intend to harm or offend the patient, so intent would not be
satisfied under alternative (1) of the Third element above. Nor should
alternative (2) support a finding of intent. At the moment of the contact,
he mistakenly believed that he was extracting the correct molar, the one to
which he believed the patient had consented. The dental surgeon of course
knew what the essential nature of the contact-losing the wrong tooth-
would be if the plaintiff were unwilling to undergo the contact or consent
were otherwise absent. And, at one time he may also have known that the
patient had expressed consent only to the extraction of the right molar.
But, later, at the crucial moment of initiating the contact, he mistakenly
extracted the wrong tooth. Therefore, he was not contemporaneously
cognizant that he was deviating from the patient's evident consent. He did
not realize that he was about to extract the wrong tooth. The prior conduct
of the patient indicating which tooth to extract was not within the
surgeon's decisional consciousness. Therefore, I believe that under such
circumstances, whether our dental surgeon should be liable for mistakenly
84. See DOBBS ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 50, at 35 ("If you agree that offense is
intended when the defendant intends to touch knowing that the plaintiff has not consented to it, a
jury could easily conclude that . . . intent to offend . . . existed. Liability is imposed when the
defendant ... knows that the touching is not consented to, since intent to engage in unconsented-to
conduct will always count as offense."); DOBBS & HAYDEN, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra note
50, § 32, at 9-10 (stating that "the physician who knows he exceeds consent has intent to offend by
touchings the patient did not consent to").
85. Cf Lawson, supra note 11, at 384. Although I agree with the two-alternative direction
represented by Lawson, I advocate a more robust, full set of elements, all of which the plaintiff must
satisfy in every case. See supra note 55 discussing and critiquing the Lawson proposal.
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extracting the wrong tooth should depend solely on negligence principles86
and should not be actionable under the intentional tort of battery. 8
C. Policy Justifications for Proposed Formulation
I believe the proposed formulation is worthy of consideration. First, it
better harmonizes the intentional tort of battery with the fault system.
While there may be sound policy reasons for imposing strict liability for
certain types of activities, such as abnormally dangerous activities, 89 those
considerations do not apply to battery liability. Unless a defendant's
conduct satisfies the proposed intent requirement, liability should depend on
negligence principles.90 Imposing battery liability without satisfying the
Third element blurs the fault line between negligence and battery and rings
hollow. It elevates "what is essentially a negligence action to the status of
an intentional tort based on the fortuity that touching is a necessary incident
to treatment in a relationship which is consensual in nature."9'
The distributive goals of loss spreading9 2 and loss allocation93 are also
adequately served by a battery liability circumscribed by the parameters I
have suggested, coupled with potential negligence liability. The proposed
formulation, although contemplating a narrower battery liability than one
based on the mere intent to contact rule, would nevertheless still address the
more egregious cases. Indeed, the fact that harm or offense was deliberately
caused, for example, may actually contribute to the plaintiffs offense or
level of suffering. 94 Negligence law provides a satisfactory regime for cases
86. See, e.g., Pacheco v. Ames, 69 P.3d 324, 325, 328 (Wash. 2003) (holding that res ipsa
loquitur was applicable to a claim asserting negligent malpractice in which it was alleged that an oral
surgeon who undertook to remove "three impacted wisdom teeth" and allegedly drilled on the wrong
side of the patient's jaw causing nerve damage, and stating that "it is within the general experience
of mankind that the act of drilling on the wrong side of a patient's jaw would not ordinarily take
place without negligence").
87. See Lawson, supra note I1, at 377.
88. See DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTs, supra note 11, at 59.
89. See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally
Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 341, 349-60 (1996).
90. Some commentators would even go further in restricting the scope of intentional torts. See
Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, 50
UCLA L. REv. 585, 594 (2002) ("I reject the idea that we benefit from having a separate tort for
unconsented-to, offensive, physical touching. Rather, I believe we should ask whether the touching
of one by another was reasonable or not. If it was reasonable, then generally there should be no
liability, and certainly not fault-based liability.").
91. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123, 1133 (Me. 1980).
92. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages, and the Goals of Tort
Law, 57 SMU L. REv. 163, 182-85 (2004) [hereinafter King, Pain andSuffering].
93. See id. at 185-87.
94. As a leading treatise states, "the state of mind of the actor may make offensive a contact not
otherwise so." I FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 3.3, at 311 (3d
ed. 2006). A recent study found that the amount of self-reported pain was greater when "the events
producing the pain were understood as intentionally . .. caused." Kurt Gray & Daniel M. Wegner,
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that do not satisfy the proposed intent formulation for battery.
Admittedly, the possibility of experiencing unwelcome contacts may
affect one's sense of autonomy. I believe, however, that such interests are
sufficiently protected by the proposed battery rule when coupled with the
possibility of recovering under negligence principles. A broader battery
liability rule-one requiring only intent to cause a contact-could
reciprocally impair the autonomy of not only potential defendants but of the
broader society to engage in activities, without an equivalent enhancement
of the autonomy of potential recipients of contacts.
Finally, I believe that the mere intent to contact rule is an atavism of an
outdated historical rationale for battery. The earliest goal of tort law was the
preservation of the peace.95 Affording victims a tort remedy was thought to
help preserve peace by reducing the impetus for victims to seek revenge or
self-help by violent means.96  This goal figured centrally in the law of
battery.97  The preservation of the peace rationale-whatever its original
validity-has been obviated by criminal law and more developed social
constraints. Moreover, in any event, battery liability would remain a viable
option under my proposed formulation in more egregious cases.
The standard of intent in battery cases is for the most part subjective,
focusing largely on what the defendant knew and was thinking.9 8 There may
be concern that my proposed rule affords defendants too much latitude to
avoid a finding of intent. Even if a defendant is shown to have intended the
contact, there may be concern that the defendant might still attempt to avoid
battery liability under the Third element merely by proclaiming that he
neither intended to harm or offend the plaintiff nor had knowledge of the
absence or his deviation from the scope of consent and thought he had
consent. I believe, however, that such a concern would be unwarranted. For
one thing, the state of mind component of intent may consist of either a
purpose or knowledge to a substantial certainty. Thus, it will be sufficient if
the defendant knew to substantial certainty that the contact would be harmful
or offensive or was aware of the absence of evident consent. Moreover, in
assessing a defendant's state of mind-what was on his mind and what he
The Sting of Intentional Pain, 19 PSYCHOL. SC. 1260 (2008). The authors explained that
"[a]lthough pain was traditionally conceived to be solely physical in nature ... its experience varies
substantially with psychological context," adding that "the meaning of a harm-whether it was
intended-influences the amount of pain it causes." Id. at 1260-61.
95. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that in medieval Britain, tort law
aimed principally at discouraging violence and revenge).
96. Id.
97. HARPER ET AL., supra note 94, § 3.1, at 304; see also GEISTFELD, supra note 11, at 117-18,
122.
98. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 11, § 24, at 49.
649
knew-the courts and juries should consider all relevant facts. Professor
Dobbs aptly comments that "[a]lthough the relevant intent is subjective, the
trier of fact has no mind reading machine to determine that subjective intent.
One's subjective intent is necessarily determined from external or objective
evidence."99  Furthermore, under alternative (2) of the Third element,
although what facts of which a defendant was aware is a subjective matter,
whether those facts would be understood by a reasonable person as
establishing the presence or absence of reasonably evident consent would
depend on what an objective, reasonable interpretation of those facts would
be.
The intent formulation I have posited may hopefully contribute to the
reduction of the uncertainty regarding the nature of the consequence that
must have been intended to support a claim for the tort of battery. I also
offer it for consideration as a possible way of sensibly conforming the tort of
battery to the policy goals of tort law that underlie it. Although it may not
be the final solvent (nothing ever is), it will hopefully contribute to the
conversation on the matter.
In the next section, I will examine goals that I believe should guide the
restatement process.
IV. THE PROVINCE OF RESTATEMENTS: ADDRESSING UNCERTAINTY AND
THOUGHTFULLY ASSESSING AND GUIDING THE LAW
A. Addressing Uncertainty in the Law
The American Law Institute was founded in 1923, after a thirty-five
year process leading to its establishment. 00 It is composed of a number of
99. Id; see also White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 817 (Colo. 2000) ("Juries may find it difficult to
determine the mental state of an actor, but they may rely on circumstantial evidence in reaching their
conclusion. No person can pinpoint the thoughts in the mind of another, but a jury can examine the
facts to conclude what another must have been thinking."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984) (saying that although it is "plainly incorrect for a
court to instruct a jury that an actor is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
the actor's conduct . .. it is correct to tell the jury that, relying on circumstantial evidence, they may
infer that the actor's state of mind was the same as a reasonable person's state of mind would have
been. Thus ... the defendant on a bicycle who rides down a person in full view on a sidewalk where
there is ample room to pass may learn that the factfinder (judge or jury) is unwilling to credit the
statement, 'I didn't mean to do it."'); Paul v. Holbrook, 696 So. 2d 1311, 1312 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (stating that "[p]roof of intent to commit battery is rarely subject to direct proof, but must
be established based on surrounding circumstances").
100. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Refreshing Institutional Memories: Wisconsin and the American
Law Institute-The Fairchild Lecture, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 1, 7 (1995). For a history and background
on genesis and formation of the Institute, see id. at 7-13; N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A
New Perspective on the Origins of the American Law Institute, 8 LAW & HIST. REv. 55, 56-96
(1990).
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leading law professors, judges, and attorneys.'' Perhaps its most prominent
work has been the creation and publication of restatements of the law.' 02
The impetus for both the formation of the Institute and the production of its
many restatements was to address and reduce the uncertainty in the law that
had been inwrought and intractable in the then-forty-eight state legal frame
of reference, as the "monstrous"10 3 number and complexity of judicial
opinions mushroomed.' 04 This led Benjamin Cardozo to remark that "[t]he
fecundity of our case law would make Malthus stand aghast."' 05 The Report
of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law
Institute ("Report"), which was the initial report explaining the creation of
the Institute, identified the "[t]wo chief defects in American law" as "its
uncertainty and its complexity." 06  It noted that "[t]hese defects cause
useless litigation, prevent resort to the courts to enforce just rights, make it
often impossible to advise persons of their rights, and when litigation is
begun, create delay and expense." 0 7  Specifically with respect to
101. Part I: Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the
Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law Institute, I A.L.I. PROC.
1, 2 (1923) ("[T]he success of the undertaking required the co-operation of all the organized forces
of the profession, that is, courts, bar associations, law schools and learned societies."); Abrahamson,
supra note 100, at 3, 7, 24 ("The American Law Institute, an organization of about 3500 lawyers,
judges and law professors, is perhaps best known for its preparation and production of restatements
of the law."); Hull, supra note 100, at 82 (stating that "the authors [of the Report] realized that an
alliance between treatise-writing professors and front-line practitioners and judges was the only
battle plan for long-term success").
102. Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 3; see also Jonathan R. Macey, The Transformation of the
American Law Institute, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1212, 1216 (1993) ("[Tlhe Institute is best known
for drafting 'Restatements of the Law' in various areas.").
103. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 71.
104. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, Blaming the Mirror: The Restatements and the Common
Law, 40 IND. L. REv. 205, 254 (2007) (discussing the problem of proliferation of the case law, the
high percentage of cases reversed, and "the inevitable contradictory opinions that were generated,"
and commenting that "[i]t was this crisis, whether perceived or real, to which the American Law
Institute was attempting to respond through the creation of its Restatements and which it continues
to address in modern times"); Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 12-13 ("Many in the bar were
concerned with the explosive growth of the common law, with the rapidly rising number of
published judicial opinions. The ALI's founding committee blamed this uncontrolled growth for the
uncertainty and complexity in American law."); W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its
Misleading Quality and a Proposal for Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 23, 26 (1985) (stating that
the "American Law Institute was founded to accomplish a primary goal of bringing 'certainty and
order' to decisional or case law," and that the original impetus for restatements was to address the
problem that "ever-increasing volume of court decisions heightened the law's uncertainty and lack
of clarity").
105. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 4 (1924).
106. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 6.
107. Id
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restatements, the Report stated that "[w]e speak of the work which the
organization should undertake as a restatement; its object should. . . be to
help make certain much that is now uncertain and to simplify unnecessary
complexities." 08
Importantly for present purposes, the 1923 Report specifically said of
torts that it "is a subject which has developed unsystematically and is
therefore full of the evil of uncertainty." 09  Completing and perfecting the
definition of intent for battery would thus promote one of the original
purposes of restatements-addressing uncertainty in the law. Clearly, there
is uncertainty and ambiguity in the various restatement versions and
disagreement in the case law as well as among the commentators, both in
terms of the state of the law and the most sensible approach.
An important dimension to addressing uncertainty is keeping the
Restatement as current as possible."o This ongoing responsibility for the
Institute has been recognized from the start."' "There will never be a time
when the work is done .... Such a task, by the very definition of its object,
is continuous."ll 2  The Restatement has fallen short of this goal when it
comes to the nature of the intent requirement for battery and other traditional
108. Id. at 14; see also Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 12 ("The new organization, wrote the
committee, should begin by producing restatements to clarify and simplify selected areas of the
common law."). The Report recognizes the need to gain control over "this monstrous and ever-
increasing record of judicial precedent." Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 71. It further
notes that "though the doctrine of stare decisis is the foundation stone of such certainty as the
common law has, yet their very number and still more their contrariety tend to destroy the value of
the principle and to substitute uncertainty for certainty." Id at 73.
109. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 45.
110. Herbert Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change: Problems of Policy in the Restatement
Work of the American Law Institute, 13 ST. Louis U. L.J. 185, 187 (1968) [hereinafter Wechsler,
Restatements and Legal Change] (article based on a paper presented to the Conference of Chief
Justices at its Annual Meeting on August 1, 1968) (writing that "we have and must undoubtedly
maintain a continuing commitment to keeping the Restatements current and to improving them in
every way we can"); Michael Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law
Institute, Then and Now, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 145, 164-65 (2007) ("As the Restatement Second series
and the Restatement Third series have demonstrated, there will be a constant need for updating.").
111. Thus, the Founders' Report admonished:
[A]s the conditions of life are never static, law, which is the expression of those
conditions, to fulfill the functions of its existence must be a body of rules continuously
subject to modification and change. Long before it would be possible to complete a
restatement of all the principal topics of the law, the topics first completed might need in
one direction expansion, in another modification, in another perhaps positive change. As
we conceive it, the work of the American Law Institute which we propose is not like that
of those who build a house. There will never be a time when the work is done and its
results labeled "A Complete Restatement of the Law." The work of restating the law is
rather like that of adapting a building to the ever-changing needs of those who dwell
therein. Such a task, by the very definition of its object, is continuous.
Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 43; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS intro.,
at vii (1965) ("The object of the grant was to assure that the Restatements would be revised
periodically to keep pace with the growth of the decisions in each subject. The discharge of that
continuing responsibility has been and is a major function of the Institute.").
112. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 43.
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intentional torts. The matter was first addressed in 1934 in the First
Restatement of Torts."3 And, despite two subsequent Restatements of Torts,
the attendant ambiguities persist.
The concept of entropy, as popularized by essayist K.C. Cole, can be
viewed as a "measure of the amount of disorder,"ll 4 which "can only
increase . . . [o]nce it's created.""' Professor Carl Nave explains that for
isolated systems, the natural progression is toward greater disorder.1 6
According to Cole, "[e]ntropy wins not because order is impossible but
because there are always so many more paths toward disorder than toward
order.""' In the law too, "[1]egal certainty decreases over time [and] [r]ules
and principles of law become more and more uncertain in content and in
application because legal systems are biased in favor of unraveling those
rules and principles.""'8  As each new restatement project comes and goes
without fully explicating and clarifying the essential nature of intent for the
core intentional torts, the state of the law moves inexorably from order to
disorder. Clarification of the intent element also responds to the broader
concerns about the increasingly legal complexity and disorder in the civil
justice system in general." 9 As Cole exhorts, the most impressive relief
from entropy is "the creation of life." 20 Sometimes a new formulation is
needed.
113. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 16, 18 (1934); supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
114. K.C. Cole, Hers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1982, at C2. For background on the concept of
entropy, see Carl R. Nave, Entropy as Time's Arrow, HYPERPHYSICS, http://hyperphysics.phy-
astr.gsu.edu/hbase/therm/entrop.html#e2 (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Nave, Entropy as
Time's Arrow]; Carl R. Nave, Second Law: Entropy, HYPERPHYSICS, http://hyperphysics.phy-
astr.gsu.edu/hbase/thermo/seclaw.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Nave, Second Law:
Entropy]. I have previously discussed the matter of uncertainty in the law and the challenges of
entropy in other legal contexts. See Joseph H. King, Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise
of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 709-11
(2007).
115. Cole, supra note 114, at C2 (describing entropy's "unnerving irreversibility").
116. Nave, Second Law: Entropy, supra note] 14.
117. Cole, supra note 114, at C2.
118. Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1983).
119. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 307 (1995) ("[The] basic
message is spare: under the dominant constraint of scarcity, insist that every new legal wrinkle pay
its way by some improvement in the allocation of social resources. All too often today's law does
just the opposite: it makes more complex rules that hamper the productive efficiency of the society
they regulate."); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (1992) ("[T]he critique of legal complexity extends far beyond [the tort system] to
all areas of public policy."). According to Schuck, the costs of legal complexities include
transaction costs, which are like "friction in mechanics, they are ubiquitous and limit the system's
performance," and governance costs. Schuck, supra, at 19-20.
120. Cole, supra note 114, at C2.
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B. Role ofRestatements in Thoughtfully Assessing and Guiding the
Development of the Law
1. "Is" Versus "Ought" Debate
Addressing the question of the consequence that must have been
intended to establish a viable battery claim would also be compatible with
the evolving nature of the restatements' role. From the beginning, there
have been tensions resulting from differing views of the restatements' proper
role.121 Perhaps the most prominent has been the "tension ... between
stating what the law is and what [the law] ought to be."l 2 2 Herbert Wechsler
stated the issue as "Affirm the Law or Reform the Law?" 23
Variations on this "is or ought" dialectic have also been expressed as a
tension between the goals of rigidity and flexibility,124 between stability and
growth,'12  between the interests of uniformity and of law reform,'126 and
between common law and legislation.12 7  Some commentators have gone
121. Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 17.
122. Michael Greenwald, Professional Associations Related to Law Librarians: American Law
Institute, 79 LAW. LIBR. J. 297, 301 (1987); see also Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 7 ("What is the
mission of the ALI? Is it a 'restater' of the law as it is, or an agent of law reform?"); Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic Principles Restatement, and Products Liability, 53
S.C. L. REv. 1085, 1088 (2002) ("The[] changes [to the Restatement (Third)] raise the time-honored
question of when the restatements should follow the courts, and when they should seek to lead them.
Stated another way, when should restatements focus on 'is,' and when should they focus on
'ought'?"); Alex Elson, "From the Trenches and Towers": The Case for an In-Depth Study of the
American Law Institute, 23 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 625, 627 (1998) ("How has the purpose of ALI
changed from its inception to date? More specifically, to what extent has the ALI moved from
stating the law as it is to law reform?"); John P. Frank, The American Law Institute, 1923-1998, 26
HOFSTRA L. REv. 615, 617 (1998) (referring to the "is or the ought" problem of whether "the
function of a Restatement [is] to report precisely what the law is, as by counting decisions"); Herbert
Wechsler, Report ofthe Director, 1966 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 5, 5 (1966) [hereinafter Wechsler, Report
of the Director (1966)] ("Ever since the institute began to work on the Restatements it has had to
face the problem of how far judgment as to what the law should be legitimately plays a part in
reaching a decision as to what it is.").
123. Herbert Wechsler, The Course ofthe Restatements, 55 A.B.A. J. 147, 149 (1969) [hereinafter
Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements] (drawing from a paper presented to the Conference of
Chief Justices at its Annual Meeting on August 1, 1968).
124. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 75 (discussing the importance
of striking a balance between excessive rigidity and excessive flexibility).
125. Id at 70 (discussing the need to "find[] some path of compromise between the need for
stability and the principle of growth").
126. Id. ("The Institute has not fully succeeded in establishing and communicating to the
profession ... a clear policy regarding the relation of the Restatements to law reform and efforts to
attain uniformity in the law.").
127. Adams, supra note 104, at 226 ("One view of the Restatement movement is that it was an
attempt to protect the common law against codification [but some scholars] also claim the
Restatements ultimately have borne great similarity, in form and in goals, to a code."); see also
Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. LOUIs U. L.J. 351, 371 (1969)
("The philosophy of the Restatements was opposed to the philosophy of codification. In fact, the
Restatements were supposed to save the common law from the horrors of codification. But the
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further and sought to identify tensions more in terms of underlying
jurisprudential philosophies, such as tensions between activists and
conservatives 28 or between formalism and legal realism. 129
Some commentators suggest that there was disagreement among the
Institute founders with respect to their original intent for the restatements.
Thus, Justice Abrahamson comments that "[fjrom the very beginning, the
founding members were divided about what the goals of the organization
should be. Should it simplify and state the law that is, or should it prescribe
the law that ought to be?" 3 o
A number of influential players in the formative years of the Institute,
including its first two directors, have been described as supporting the view
that the restatement's purpose was to state what that law is."3 ' But other
Restatements' goals were strikingly similar to those of the codifiers.").
128. Adams, supra note 104, at 206.
129. Id. at 242; see also Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 13 ("Not everyone greeted the formation
of the ALI or the restatements with enthusiasm. American realists with a disdain for rules criticized
the very concept of restatements."); Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at
82 (noting that the First Restatement engendered "arrows of criticism from various points of view"
including from "traditionalists" and "legal realists with their disdain for 'rules"').
130. Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 17 n.60 ("The tension between the 'is' and the 'ought'
apparently stems from the beginnings of the ALI, when some AALS members sought law reform,
while others attempted to curb the professors' zeal for change.").
131. See Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 17. Abrahamson noted that the views of ALI founders
William Draper Lewis and Herbert F. Goodrich both indicated that the Restatements were intended
to restate the law as it existed. Id. at 19. Indeed, Goodrich indicated that the purpose of the
Restatement was "to state the existing common law as developed by the courts with such care and
accuracy that courts and lawyers may rely upon the Restatement as a correct statement of the law as
it now stands." Id at 19 n.69 (quoting HERBERT F. GOODRICH, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A
SHORT SUMMARY OF PERTINENT FACTS 5 (1933)); A. James Casner, Restatement (Second) of
Property as an Instrument ofLaw Reform, 67 IOWA L. REV. 87, 88 (1981); Keyes, supra note 104, at
24 ("The goal of the original Restatements was to set down a correct statement of the 'general law'
(or 'common law') of the United States; the attempt was made to do so and, with some notable
exceptions, the goal was achieved. However, with little fanfare, and to the surprise and
disappointment of many, this goal is no longer even being attempted by the American Law Institute
in drafting the second Restatement."). Casner stated:
William Draper Lewis' statement about the objective of the Institute in preparing the
initial Restatements restricted the process of determining what the law is. Evidently,
what the law ought to be was not to be a factor in determining what the law is when the
ought-to-be result had no judicial support or was a minority position. What the law is
could not be stated in an area in which judicial feet had not trod or had made only slight
inroads. This led to the use of caveats in which the Institute stated that it took no position
in regard to such areas. Once this process had determined what the law was, no critical
analysis of whether that ought to be the law was officially undertaken by the Institute.
Casner, supra, at 88. But Goodrich would later remark, and be frequently quoted, that:
Over and over again the statement was made that we were endeavoring to state the law as
it was, not as some of us would like it to be. All the time we recognized that there were
places for a give and take even within that limitation; in cases of division of opinion a
choice had to be made and naturally we chose the view we thought was right.
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commentators believed that the founders contemplated that the restatements
would undertake a broader mission, which would include recommending
changes in the law. Thus, Professor Yntema commented that "[t]he initial
plan contemplated an ideal statement of law, analytical, critical, and
constructive, embodying whatever improvements in the law itself might be
recommended by exhaustive study."l3 2  Professor Hull presents a detailed
argument that the vision of the Institute's first director, William Draper
Lewis, was that of "a group of 'progressive-pragmatic' legal academics, who
wished to reform law and promote the influence of law professors in the
wider world of legal practice."133  Identifying Lewis's view of the
restatements' role is, however, clouded by some of his writing that seemed
to distinguish between the Institute's role and the restatements' role. For
example, although Lewis commented that the role of "the Institute as
organized is not confined to stating existing law," 34 he rejected Yntema's
view that restatements should embody recommended improvements in the
law. ' As Lewis said, "[w]e started out with the desire to restate the
existing law."' 36  But Professor Hull points to other, less formal evidence
that Lewis himself may have viewed restatement projects as vehicles for
improving the law.' Lewis's other writings are ambiguous on the issue.1
Herbert F. Goodrich, Report of the Director, 1948 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 1, 18 (1948).
132. Hessel E. Yntema, What Would Law Teachers Like to See the Institute Do?, 8 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 502, 505 (1936) [hereinafter Yntema, Law Teachers]. He then bemoaned the fact that "[t]he
actual Restatement of the Law purports to be, and is substantially limited to, a statement of the law
as it is. This departure from the original conception, it need not be emphasized, is a material
nullification of the major objective of the Institute." Id. at 505. He explained further:
The first and fundamental desideratum is to have a thorough clarification of ideas as to
what the Restatement of the Law is about. This much is certain, that the notion of
improving the law by restating it as it is is [sic] unsatisfactory. Nay more, it constitutes
an indefensible retreat from the objective of the Institute. The Institute was created to
ameliorate, not to perpetuate, the existing difficulties in the legal system.
Id at 507; see also Hessel E. Yntema, What Should the American Law Institute Do?, 34 MICH. L.
REv. 461, 465 (1936) [hereinafter Yntema, What Should the American Law Institute Do?].
133. Hull, supra note 100, at 56, 83, 85, 86.
134. William Draper Lewis, What Would Law Teachers Like to See the Institute Do?, 8 AM. L.
SCH. REV. 510, 511 (1936) [hereinafter Lewis, Law Teachers].
135. Id Lewis was responding to Yntema, Law Teachers, supra note 132, at 505. Lewis
explained:
I should like to deal first with the suggestions of Mr. Yntema . . . I was quite surprised
when I found what he had got out of a very careful study of the Report on which the
Institute was started....
I think you made just one mistake. In reading the Report you mixed what was
specifically recommended to be done in the way of Restatement with the analysis of the
defects in the law. The Restatement was never conceived for a moment as a work to
correct the defects of the law. It is an attempt to give an orderly statement of the existing
law.
As stated, the Institute as organized is not confined to stating existing law.
Lewis, Law Teachers, supra note 134, at 511 (emphasis added).
136. Lewis, Law Teachers, supra note 134, at 510.
137. See Hull, supra note 100, at 55-56.
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One important source for divining the founders' original intent is the
crucial Report.'"9 The formative steps leading to the eventual creation of the
Institute can be traced to actions taken by the Association of American Law
Schools in 1914 and 1915, then (after interruption by the First World War)
to the creation of several committees, culminating in the Committee on the
Establishment of a Juristic Center,140 and finally to the Committee on the
Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the
Law.141 This committee proceeded to draft a report with the intention of
breathing life into the Institute. On June 28, 1922, there occurred an
important basal meeting of key players to discuss the proposed report eight
months prior to its publication.142 The conveners and participants at the pre-
report meeting "focused on what the proposed [R]estatement should contain
and what form it should take. The agenda also identified three goals for the
[r]estatement: clarification, simplification, and 'adaptation [of the law] to the
needs of life."'l 43  According to Professor Hull, "[t]he first two goals
responded to the oft-repeated complaints of both progressive and formalist
academics, and practitioners and judges," while "the [t]hird, explicitly
reformist goal, represented the contribution of the progressive-pragmatist
professors."'
The foundational Report 4 5 was published on February 23, 1923 .146 Key
language of this Report provides strong support for the view that the
founders of the Institute contemplated a broader mission for the Restatement
than merely attempting a nose-count for case-law categories. The Report
states:
We speak of the work which the organization should undertake
as a restatement; its object should not only be to help make certain
138. See William Draper Lewis, History of the American Law Institute and the First Restatement
ofthe Law: "How We Did It", 1945 RESTATEMENT IN THE CTS. 1, 8, 12 [hereinafter Lewis, History
of the American Law Institute] ("[T]he rule that the Restatement should be prepared in the light of
case authority has been adhered to. The Restatement does represent the considered opinion of those
constructing it, of the way in which the law would be decided in the light of decisions by the
courts.... The Restatement states the law as it would be today decided by the great majority of
courts.").
139. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 1.
140. Part II: An Account of the Proceedings at the Organization of the Institute in Washington,
D. C., on February 23, 1923, 1 A.L.I. PROC. 1, 3 (1923).
141. Id.
142. Hull, supra note 100, at 81.
143. Id. (alteration in original).
144. Id.
145. The Report was drafted by the Permanent Organization Committee. Id.
146. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 1.
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much that is now uncertain and to simplify unnecessary
complexities, but also to promote those changes which will tend
better to adapt the laws to the needs of life. The character of the
restatement ... should be at once analytical, critical and
constructive.
The restatement should be critical, because it must be more than
a collection and comparison of statutes and decisions, ... more than
an exposition of the existing law, even though such exposition were
an accurate photograph of all the law's existing certainties and
uncertainties. There should be a thorough examination of legal
theory. The reason for the law as it is should be set forth, or where
it is uncertain, the reasons in support of each suggested solution of
the problem should be carefully considered.
Again, where the law is uncertain or where diferences in the
law of different jurisdictions exist not due to differences in
economic and social conditions, the restatement, while setting forth
the existing uncertainty, should make clear what is believed to be
the proper rule of law. The degree of existing uncertainty in the
law would not necessarily be reduced by a mere explanation of rival
legal theories. Indeed, a restatement which confined itself to such
an explanation would reduce the degree of existing uncertainty only
in those instances where but one line of decisions was supported by
reasons worthy of consideration. Where the uncertainty is due, as it
often is, to the existence of situations presenting legal problems on
the proper solution of which trained lawyers may differ, the courts
can best be helped by support given to one definite answer to the
problem.
... Such a restatement will also effect changes in the law, which it
is proper for an organization of lawyers to promote and which will
make the law better adapted to the needs of life.147
While "real cases" were to be given their due "based on a careful
study," it was for the purpose of a "statement of what is or what should be
the law."148 The Report also specifically acknowledges and discusses, in the
context of how courts might use the restatements, the situations in which
"the statement of the law set forth is against the weight of authority in most
of the states."1 4 9 The Report also states that "[t]he Institute must not only
147. Id. at 14-15, 18 (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 26.
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ascertain what the law is but what it ought to be."150
The ostensible lack of consensus, in the vision of the founders, for the
nature of restatements may reflect not so much a fundamental disagreement
or even a realization at the time of a so-called "is-ought" divide. After all,
not only was the Institute something new, but so was the notion of
restatements. I suspect that the founders' visions of the appropriate frame of
reference and contours for the restatements was not as crystallized or
manifest as their views have been perceived in hindsight, especially when
informed by the realities of the various restatements as they materialized and
evolved over the decades after 1923. To the extent that the founders did
have a vision for the future restatements, it probably vacillated somewhere
between the "is" and "ought" poles. As Professor Greenwald has opined,
"[a]lthough the Restatements were clearly not intended to be radical
reformulations of the law ... the founding Committee envisioned something
more than mere restatement of existing uncertainty and confusion."15
The first systematic written account in Greek mythology of the
inception, or coming into existence, or salience of the universe was a poem
of only a thousand lines.152 Examining the inception of a phenomenon is
easier when there is a predominant account, even of the mythological
universe. The founders' Report is similarly the most complete account of
the origin of the Institute. But unlike the mythological vision of a completed
"permanent and unchanging"15 3 universe, the Institute founders' Report,
while being the most important first word on the origins of the Institute, was
certainly not the only or last word. Crucially, the nature of restatements is
evolving as the debate continues over their role and form. Nearly a quarter
of a century after the formation of the Institute, one of its most respected and
influential directors, Herbert Wechsler, saw the continuing need to address
the "question of how far in the restatement of the law it is appropriate to take
account of an opinion as to what the law should be." 5 4 A few years later, he
posed the question: "Affirm the Law or Reform the Law?"' 55 Later, Dean
Wade even questioned whether there ever was a test or accepted antecedent
150. Id at 55.
151. Greenwald, supra note 122, at 301.
152. See JENNY STRAUSS CLAY, HESIOD'S COSMOS 1-2 (2003) (stating that the Hesiod's
"Theogony offers an account of the genesis of the cosmos and the gods" and was "the first
systematic presentation of the nature of the divine and human cosmos, of Being and Becoming");
ELIZABETH VANDIVER, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY: COURSE GUIDEBOOK 20 (2000) (referring to the
Theogony as the "most complete surviving Greek account" of the universe coming "into being").
153. CLAY, supra note 152, at 8.
154. Wechsler, Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 5.
155. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 149 (article drawn from a
paper presented to the Conference of Chief Justices at its Annual Meeting on August 1, 1968).
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for what it was that the restatements were stating.156  Commentators have
noted that "[t]he dispute as to the mission of the [Institute] has not been
resolved and, no doubt, will continue well into the future."' 57
2. The False "Is or Ought" Dichotomy
a. Questionable Premises
The much proclaimed grand tension between the goals of restating the
law as it is and of stating the law as it ought to be, assumes a separateness of
the two perspectives that may be largely illusory. It is a false dichotomy.
Unity, rather than separateness, aptly describes not only the attitude, but also
the perspective of the courts in crafting the law. That same unity of the law
as it is currently, and as it is believed ought to be, should be acknowledged
and embraced by those "restating" "the law."' 58 Neither the role of courts in
deciding the course of the law nor the role of the restatements in stating core
substantive legal rules should be boxed into a semantic bivalence that
assumes an is-or-ought dichotomy, a separateness of those two perspectives,
or that such a dichotomous proposition points to exactly one of two truth
values.
Herbert Wechsler, who served as the American Law Institute's third
director during the Institute's most transformative period from 1963 to
1984,159 took an increasingly holistic view of the appropriate goals for the
restatement. In 1966, when what might be termed the "Wechsler Manifesto"
began to crystallize, Wechsler wrote of the reasoning and decision-making
in the courts:
156. See Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 62 ("Those primarily
responsible for the Second Restatement did not attempt to develop a firmly established test for
determining the present state of the general common law. They instead came to utilize a growing
amount of leeway in making this determination and in choosing the language for stating the rule or
principle.").
157. Elson, supra note 122, at 630; see also Abrahamson, supra note 100, at 17 ("Should it
simplify and state the law that is, or should it prescribe the law that ought to be? This division
between the 'is' and the 'ought' appears in the ALI's founding documents and continues to this
day."); Frank, supra note 122, at 617 (referring to the "is or the ought" problem of whether it is "the
function of a Restatement to report precisely what the law is, as by counting decisions, or should it
give some consideration to what the law ought to be," as one "which has confronted the Institute
from then until now"); cf A. Dan Tarlock. Touch and Concern Is Dead, Long Live the Doctrine, 77
NEB. L. REv. 804, 805 n.3 (1998) ("The question of the basic purpose of the ... (ALI) continues to
be the subject of lively historical and contemporary debate.").
158. See Wechsler, Restatements and Legal Change, supra note 110, at 190 ("[I]f we ask
ourselves what courts will do in fact within this area, can we divorce our answers wholly from our
view of what they ought to do, given the factors that appropriately influence their judgments, under
the prevailing view of the judicial function?").
159. Ali.org, Herbert Wechsler 1909-2000, THE ALI REPORTER, Summer 2000, http://www.ali.
org/alilR2204_Wechsler.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010) ("Herbert Wechsler ... served from 1963 to
1984 as the Institute's third Director.").
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Does not the statement of a rule involve, then, something more than
the conclusion that it is supported by the past decisions? Is there
not also the implicit judgment that our courts today would not
perceive a change of situation calling for the adaptation of the rule
or even for a new departure? And if we ask ourselves what courts
will do in fact within this area, can we divorce our answer wholly
from our view of what they ought to do, given the factors that
appropriately influence their judgments . .. ?160
That statement was a premise for Wechsler's holistic vision for the
restatements. Wechsler asked rhetorically "if we are not obliged in our own
deliberations to weigh all of the considerations relevant to the development
of common law that our polity calls on the courts to weigh in theirs."161 A
year later he would reiterate for those crafting restatements his "working
formula that we should feel obliged in our deliberations to give weight to all
of the considerations that the courts, under a proper view of the judicial
function, deem it right to weigh in theirs."l 62 Wechsler later more explicitly
pointed to a convergence and commingling of the "is and ought" dichotomy.
He observed that "any statement that the law is such and such is more than
an empiric finding that decisions have so held-that it implies a normative
assertion as to what should now be held." 63  Wechsler's formula is a
convergence of the polestars for case law and the restatement rules, which
should be, according to Wechsler, animated by the similar considerations.
b. Specious Premise of a Discernible Static State of the Law
The perceived dichotomy between whether the restatements should state
the law as it "is" or as it "ought" to be also may depend on unrealistic
160. Wechsler, Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 6.
161. Id at 9. Seeing a more creative role for the restatements than merely parroting the law as it
was perceived to have been, he wrote:
[S]hould we not at least make clear, as we proceed, the areas in which we think such
renovation is in order, especially when we believe the task to fall within the province of
the courts of last resort under a proper view of the judicial function? .. . My purpose ...
is to ask if we are not obliged in our own deliberations to weigh all of the considerations
relevant to the development of common law that our polity calls on the courts to weigh in
theirs.
Id.
162. Herbert Wechsler, Report of the Director, 1967 A.L.I. ANN. REP. 1, 5 (1967) [hereinafter
Wechsler, Report of the Director (1967)]; Michael D. Green & William C. Powers, Jr., Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm: An Introduction, in A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, at xiii (2d
ed. 2010) (quoting the preceding, and noting that the words "grace the wall of the conference room
at the Institute").
163. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 150.
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assumptions about the underlying legal landscape. One is that an issue has
been addressed by a well delineated corpus of case law, neatly divided into
majority and minority positions. Sometimes, of course, the cases are clear,
and there is no marked division of authority,'6 which could arguably
lessen the salience of the "is-ought" dichotomy. But, often the state of the
law is not clear or discernible or has not produced well-delineated majority
and minority positions. The case law often is unclear, ambiguous, or
inconclusive so that a court's approach to a question simply cannot be
deduced from the opinion. We find not a linear case law panorama, but
one of subtle nuances and black holes. Moreover, even when the courts
have clearly spoken on a question, there may be many permutations, with
nuances, caveats, and polycentric variables. There may also be more than
two approaches to a question, sometimes many more, depending on how
simplistic an analysis of the case law a scholar-analyst is willing to
indulge. The vitality of the "is or ought" debate depends on whether a
restater can come up with a meaningful categorization and nose count of
the cases, so that they might know whether there is a consensus position,
one that represents a majority or minority rule, or something else. I
believe tallying or reckoning of positions may not even be feasible. 165 The
position of a case (or more commonly a series of cases) in a jurisdiction
may not be that transparent. Dean Wade states the obvious reality that
"[m]any court decisions are very difficult to interpret and thus very
difficult to 'line up."'"
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Moreover, assessing the weight of the case law requires that one freeze
the frame of a case law that is often evolving at multiple levels, that is in
other words a very movable target. Dean Wade, the Reporter for about
half of the Restatement (Second) of Torts said "[i]f there ever was a
thought that the restatement would 'catch' the condition of the law at a
particular time and crystallize and hold it there, that idea has long since
been abandoned. . . . It is prepared with an eye to the future as well as the
past." 167
Nor are judicial decisions and opinions fungible, and, thus, the states
may not be realistically commensurable for the purposes of a tally. Some
jurisdictions may have barely hinted at resolution of a question, while
others may have produced an impressive line of cases that address the
question. Cases also may vary by level of the court and date or currency,
164. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Stable Divisions ofAuthority, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 963, 964
(2009) (stating that as the law has matured,"[o]ver time, the law of different states will converge").
165. Cf DAVID G OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 165 n.89 (2d ed. 2008) ("One must be
cautious about counting jurisdictions on most legal issues, particularly issues . . . that are fuzzy at
best.").
166. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 62.
167. John W. Wade, Second Restatement of Torts Completed, 65 A.B.A. J. 366, 371 (1979)
[hereinafter Wade, Second Restatement of Torts Completed].
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and there may also be significant differences in the quality and rigor of the
courts' reasoning. Herbert Wechsler said that:
[E]ven as a law student forty years ago, I knew that germinal
opinions like those of Judge Cardozo in the Palsgraf case,
MacPherson ... or Ultramares ... had been embraced in the drafts
of the first Restatement long before they had much following in
other courts in the view that they were right and should be followed,
and that this was the very process pursued in adopting Section
402A.16 1
Nearly two decades later, Dean Wade would second this. 169 Searching for a
static state of the law through a rear-view often "shakes a dead geranium."170
Even when there appears to be a clearly delineated and fairly stable
division of authority on a question, '7 the "is or ought" dichotomy is more
academic than real. In those instances, the wisdom of the restatement
guiding the direction of the law should be obvious.
c. The Heisenberg Principle
In 1926, Werner Heisenberg formulated the "uncertainty principle." 72
He postulated that an object's velocity and present position cannot be
measured without shining light on it, but that the energy from shining the
light may alter the particle's velocity.' 73  Therefore, "the more accurately
you try to measure the position of the particle, the less accurately you can
measure its speed."l 7 4 In other words, the light of analysis may affect the
result. A more popularized conception of the rule might be that "the act of
observing ... may itself distort the phenomenon under observation.""'7  A
168. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 149-50.
169. See Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 62. He commented:
"Some opinions are much more cogently reasoned and persuasive than others .... Some rules ...
more logically consistent with the principles underlying the particular area of the law; some rules
balance the conflicting interests of the parties more fairly." Id. at 62. Especially when there appear
to be two separate lines of authority, "[t]he decision is not only influenced by the number of states
espousing each, but also by the convincing quality of the several court opinions and the viewpoint of
the Restaters as to which is the better rule-the more principled one." Id. at 77.
170. T.S. ELIOT, Rhapsody on a Windy Night, in T.S. ELIOT, COLLECTED POEMS 1909-62, at 16
(1970).
171. See Abraham, supra note 164, at 964.
172. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 56 (10th ed. 1998). My brief summary is
based in part on a previous article. See King, supra note 92, at 179-80.
173. HAWKING, supra note 172, at 56-57.
174. Id at 57.
175. Jack Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 909 (1982); see also
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similar phenomenon may apply to the restatement process. A restatement
project may stretch over years, and the evolving process may itself
significantly affect the course of the case law. Drafts are circulated,
analyzed, and increasingly relied upon by the courts. Influential law review
commentary on the questions addressed in the various official restatement
drafts emanates. Herbert Wechsler wrote that "when the Institute's adoption
of the view of a minority of courts has helped to shift the balance of
authority, it is quite clear that this has been regarded as a vindication of our
judgment and a proper cause for exultation."l 76
Thus, the object assessed-the state of the law-may itself be shaped to
a significant extent by the restatement process of assessment, synthesis,
analysis, and drafting. As Alexander Pope marvelously put it, "Like
following life through creatures you dissect, You lose it in the moment you
detect." 7
d. Evolving Sense of the Role ofRestatements
An "is versus ought" dichotomy is also based on the unrealistic premise
that restatements follow a set normative course. But what restatements do is
dynamic and polycentric. There is no neat fixed monolithic restatement
operative model. A shift in the role of the restatements was evident in
various pronouncements of directors of the Institute. In 1948, Director
Herbert Goodrich stated:
Over and over again the statement was made that we were
endeavoring to state the law as it was, not as some of us would like
it to be. All the time we recognized that there were places for a give
and take even within that limitation; in cases of division of opinion
a choice had to be made and naturally we chose the view we
thought was right.11
In 1966, Director Herbert Wechsler also addressed the situation in
which the case law was divided, requiring that a choice be made. And in
deciding what was "right," he explained:
Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern
Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1989); Daniel S. Goldberg, Comment, And the Walls Came
Tumbling Down: How Classical Scientific Fallacies Undermine the Validity of Textualism and
Originalism, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 463, 479-81 (2002).
176. Wechsler, Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 6; see also Caleb Nelson, The
Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 511 n.35 (2006) ("Even when a particular
section of a particular Restatement rejects a clear majority rule in favor of some minority
position .. . the position advocated by the Restatement often becomes the new majority rule.").
177. ALEXANDER POPE, An Epistle To Sir Richard Temple, Lord Cobham, in THE OXFORD
AUTHORS: ALEXANDER POPE 319, 320, lines 29-30 (Pat Rogers ed., 1993).
178. Goodrich, Report of the Director, supra note 131, at 18.
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In judging what was "right," a preponderating balance of authority
would normally be given weight, as it no doubt would generally
weigh with courts, but it has not been thought to be conclusive.
And when the Institute's adoption of the view of a minority of
courts has helped to shift the balance of authority, it is quite clear
that this has been regarded as a vindication of our judgment and a
proper cause for exultation. "'
He also later made it clear that even "in the absence of a cleavage of
authority ... the institute is not obliged to govern its appraisals by a count of
jurisdictions." 80  Perhaps most importantly, while acknowledging what the
practice had been when there was no substantial split of authority,"'8  he
suggested as his guiding course that the restatements be guided by "all of the
considerations . . . [that] the courts . . . weigh in theirs." 82 In later citing
support for his position, Wechsler made it clear that his rule was not limited
to situations in which the case law was divided. He thus flatly rejected "the
dogma that a rule supported by decisions must be stated in the absence of a
cleavage of authority and without assessment of the influence that such
decisions would or should exert on a contemporary court.""' The
restatements should be guided by the same considerations as those to which
the courts should look, including not only precedent,184 but also "a change of
situation calling for the adaption of the rule or even for a new departure." 85
Dean John Wade was the Reporter for many of the most revised and
reshaped sections of the Second Restatement of Torts.'86  He described the
evolving attitudes toward the role of the restatements:
As the first Restatement was getting underway . .. [i]t expected its
Blackletter sections to be accepted on the basis of the magisterial
179. Wechsler, Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 6; see also Wechsler, The Course
of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 149.
180. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 150.
181. He noted that "where no substantial cleavage has as yet appeared in the decisions ... the
practice on the whole has been to state the rule of such decisions as there are . . . even if [a] case . . .
of first impression," with possible caveats and elaboration on doubts about the decisions. Wechsler,
Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 6.
182. Id. at 9; see also Wechsler, Report of the Director (1967), supra note 162, at 5.
183. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 150.
184. Wechsler, Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 5 ("The common law calls on the
courts to show a due regard for the precedent but also calls on them to choose between conflicting
lines of doctrine . . .
185. Id. at 6.
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 504-951 (1977 & 1979). Dean Wade broke
much new ground, such as the total reworking of the law on defamation and privacy, and extensive
development of the economic torts.
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authority of the Institute, rather than the persuasive nature of an
explanation of the rule. Only occasionally did it adopt a rule that
was followed by only a small minority of the courts.' 87
But, even in the First Restatement, this position became somewhat
relaxed.'8 1 And, "[a]s the second Restatement got underway some two
decades later, the Restaters . .. felt more free to adopt a minority rule if a
clear trend existed in that direction, and this was normally done with a
candid explanations of the matter." 8 9
The actual Second Restatement displayed an even more proactive,
creative orientation:
[The first] two volumes .. . played a significant part in the
development of the law-for instance, Section 402A and the growth
of strict liability for products.
187. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 68. For a recent example of
the drafters' formulation of a rule that they believed was the "best way," despite the dearth of
relevant law on the matter, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 26
(2000); id. Reporters' Note cmt. d (stating that although "[t]here is very little case law or statutory
language addressing these issues" and the approach of "dividing damages by causation before
applying comparative responsibility," that "[ulltimately, its support depends not on case law, but on
its being the best way, whenever feasible, to effectuate the goals of causation and comparative
responsibility").
188. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 68, 72. Wade said:
In later work on some parts of the first Restatement this position appears to have been
somewhat relaxed.
(The practice] in which a choice has been made between two recognized lines of
authority and the minority position is selected for the Blackletter rule .. .was followed in
a good number of cases, even in the first Restatement, and it is fully in accord with
statements in the original Report of the Committee on Establishment.
Id. There are examples of this broader, more creative focus even in the First Restatement. In the
drafting of the provision dealing with the effect of "Assent to Invasion Constituting a Crime," the
restaters adopted what they admitted was a minority position. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 6,
prob. 4, at 17 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1923) (Reporter's Brief) ("At the meeting at Cambridge
there was a substantial unanimous vote of my advisers then present that the statement should reject
the vastly preponderated weight of American authority . . . that consent to a battery, involving a
breach of the peace or any other unlawful contact, is no bar to an action of trespass for such
battery."); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 6 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1923) ("Consent prevents a
touching from being a battery, though the touching consented to is one which offends the peace and
good order of the state and so becomes an offense against the state itself, and not merely against the
state as vindicator of the private rights of its citizens."). They also inserted the following "Note for
the Council": "This section states the view of a numerical minority of the American jurisdictions
before which the question has been presented for decision. The reasons for preferring the minority
view are fully stated in the Columbia Law Review, December, 1924. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 70, n. I (Preliminary Draft No. 10, 1924). The preceding note was inserted by the drafters
to accompany then section 70 (previously section 6), which along with the exception in section 71
were eventually approved with minor revisions as sections 60-61, which in turn evolved into section
892C of the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892C (1979).
189. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 68 ("It is normal practice to
state the majority rule in the Blackletter. Sometimes, however, a minority rule is stated in the same
Blackletter as if it were the majority rule.").
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Volumes 3 and 4 depict the trend toward reform of the common
law of torts to eliminate anomalies and logical inconsistencies and
to make the state of the law more reflective of modern social and
economic conditions and current mores and concepts of justice.
There are many important changes that are "restated" in these latest
volumes.
... An attempt has been made to extrapolate from the principles
stated in or deduced from the [Supreme Court First Amendment
defamation] opinions.
The American Law Institute has worked assiduously to bring the
restatement of torts up to date and to make it accurately descriptive
of the current state of the law and reflective of recognizable trends
that foretell impending developments.
... The chapters on defamation reflect an interpretation of Supreme
Court decisions and prognostications of their implications for other
issues not covered in the cases. 190
Wade's vision of the Restatement contemplated not only many changes
in substantive tort law, but a forward-looking perspective, one "reflective of
recognizable trends that foretell impending developments."' 9' More
recently, Professor Michael Greenwald said that "one of the most significant
contributions of the Restatements has been the extent to which they have
anticipated the direction in which the law is tending and suggested salutary
avenues of development, consistent with established principles, in areas in
which there have been few or no decided cases."l 92
Wade suggested flexibility in appraising the state of the law:
Those primarily responsible for the second Restatement did not
attempt to develop a firmly established test for determining the
present state of the general common law. They instead came to
utilize a growing amount of leeway in making this determination
and in choosing the language for stating the rule or principle. 193
190. Wade, Second Restatement of Torts Completed, supra note 167, at 366-67, 371 (emphasis
added).
191. Id. at 371.
192. Greenwald, supra note 122, at 301.
193. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 62.
667
Wade addressed the question of the role of restatements in various case
law postures.194 He questioned the assumption that the test for deciding
what rule should be propounded "would normally be the position taken by a
majority of the states passing on the issue." He explained that "[i]t is hard
to believe that the Reporters and their Advisors, even in the first
Restatement, made a point of compiling the number of states lined up on
each side of an issue and mechanically adopted the side with the most
votes."' 96  Where there are majority and minority views, restaters for the
Second Restatement "felt more free to adopt a minority rule if a clear trend
existed in that direction, and this was normally done with a candid
explanation of the matter."' 97 He elaborated, stating that although it was the
"normal practice to state the majority rule in the Blackletter," nevertheless
"[s]ometimes ... a minority rule is stated in the same Blackletter as if it
were the majority rule."' 98 He reasoned that "[f]aying down the bad rule
may have the effect of reinforcing it and prolonging its lifespan. Stating a
better rule may lead one who relies upon it into unfortunate consequences
when the court does not follow it."' 99 This was not, however, a true
dilemma because "[a] Restater can select either horn without fully
committing himself if he explains the situation and indicates why the choice
was made."2 00 When "there are several different positions taken on a
particular issue in the various states," the restaters would "normally look
first to see if there is a clear majority" but recognized that in many situations
other considerations "may . .. play a significant part in reaching conclusions
as to what the Restatement should say; the result may be an amalgam of
these various considerations." 20' Wade asked rhetorically:
Should they give greater weight to the opinions of those courts
generally recognized as possessing superior talent, or to particular
opinions that are unusually well-reasoned and therefore more
persuasive?
Should they instead look to the broad principles underlying the
rules governing particular issues and determine what rule is most
consistent with the general principle? Does this mean, if the rule
seems to fit in well with the general principles but the legal analysis
generally given in support of the rule seems logically unsound, that
they should make use of the more logical analysis while retaining
194. Id. at 65.
195. Id at 62.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 68.
198. Id "The [S]econd Restatement has followed the practice of stating expressly in the
Comments or in the Reporter's Notes when this has been done." Id. at 83.
199. Id. at 67.
200. Id. at 68.
201. Id. at 65.
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the rule? Should they give any consideration to their own viewpoint
regarding logical consistency and the desirability of the ultimate
results of particular rules? 20 2
He elaborated that when there are two separate lines of authority, "[t]he
decision is not only influenced by the number of states espousing each, but
also by the convincing quality of the several court opinions and the
viewpoint of the restaters as to which is the better rule-the more principled
one." 203 Similarly, Wechsler wrote that "[i]n judging what was 'right[,'] a
preponderating balance of authority would normally be given weight, as it
no doubt would generally weigh with courts, but it has not been thought to
be conclusive." 204
When there appears to be one case law position and "little or no
authority the other way[,J" Wade says that ordinarily "[t]he Blackletter
would reflect the actual state of the law, but the discussion would suggest
the desirability of changing it for a better rule."205 But, even here, Herbert
Wechsler has suggested that the role of restatements appears to be
shifting. 206 Thus, he wrote that the Institute "should ... liberate the process
of restatements from any surviving rigid limitations, like the dogma that a
rule supported by decisions must be stated in the absence of a cleavage of
authority and without assessment of the influence that such decisions would
or should exert on a contemporary court."207
Rather than focus exclusively on a nose count of the states (often a vain
effort) and then "restate" the "majority rule," the restatements themselves
evidence a broadening focus to encompass and weigh trends in the law. For
signs of this, one need only consider the observations of the influential
reporters for the two major segments of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The quintessential example of the restatement adopting a so-called minority
rule was the adoption of Section 402A in the Second Restatement.208
According to Herbert Wechsler, "members of the institute were well aware
when they approved Section 402A that decisions in support could be
adduced in only a minority of states," but nevertheless were persuaded by
"the direction that the law was taking on the strength bf its momentum., 209
202. Id.
203. Id. at 77.
204. Wechsler, Report of the Director (1966), supra note 122, at 6.
205. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 72-73.
206. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 150.
207. Id
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
209. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 149.
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Dean William Prosser, the Reporter for Sections 1-503 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, 2 0 explained the impetus for Section 402A. Prosser saw a
products liability case law that was "expanding with almost explosive
force."211* Prosser expressed concern that if a more restrictive version were
published that summer "it will be on the edge of becoming dated before it is
published[,]" adding that he "would venture to predict that in another 50
years this has fair chances of becoming a majority rule in the United
States .... "2 12  This turned out to markedly underestimate the rapidity of
change. 2 13  And, later, Dean Wade commented that "[v]olumes 3 and 4
depict the trend toward reform of the common law ... reflective of modem
social and economic conditions and current mores and concepts of
justice. 2 14 The modem view was summed up as follows:
Especially in modem times, ... members of the American Law
Institute have not viewed the Restatements as mere compendia of
"majority rules"; to varying degrees, modem Restatements strive to
identify the law as it should be rather than as it is, and the fact that
most states have rejected a particular legal rule will not necessarily
keep the relevant Restatement from embracing it. 2 15
Recently, two of the Reporters for the latest torts restatement project put
it succinctly: "Restatements are not simply a 'restatement' of what courts
have done. In many cases they attempt to synthesize decisions that seem
disparate or confused. Sometimes, they attempt to rationalize a
doctrine .... Sometimes they are prescriptive rather than descriptive,
providing rules that the Institute believes are an improvement.",2 16
Thus, important players and commentators in restatements have
propounded a more flexible, proactive, and creative orientation for
restatements. However, not everyone has endorsed this broader
21
orientation.217 The Institute's Handbook itself displays some
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
211. 41 A.L.I. PROC. 349 (1964) (remarks of Reporter William L. Prosser).
212. Id. at 350.
213. See Dominick Vetri, Order Out of Chaos: Products Liability Design-Defect Law, 43 U.
RICH. L. REv. 1373, 1374 (2009) ("Section 402A caught on like wildfire in American state courts.
No single doctrinal common law principle was ever adopted so widely and quickly in the United
States as strict products liability."(footnotes omitted)).
214. Wade, Second Restatement of Torts Completed, supra note 167, at 366.
215. Nelson, supra note 176, at 51 n.35.
216. Green & Powers, supra note 162, at xiii.
217. See Cupp, supra note 122, at 1088. Cupp states:
Except in areas truly crying out for reform, I tend to lean toward the notion that
restatements should follow more than they lead. They likely garner more respect, and
more relevance, when the legal community senses that the restatements are thoughtfil
and accurate reflections of the courts' dominant approaches to legal issues. In some
instances following the courts is impractical, because the decisions are jumbled or
hopelessly confused, and in such situations the restatements need to say what the law
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ambivalence.218 Yet, at the same time, it states that "Restatements aim at
clear formulations of common law and its statutory elements or variations
and reflect the law as it presently stands or might plausibly be stated by a
court."2 19  The Handbook candidly acknowledges "the central tension
between the two impulses at the heart of the Restatement process from the
beginning, the impulse to recapitulate the law as it presently exists and the
impulse to reformulate it, thereby rendering it clearer and more coherent
while subtly transforming it in the process."220
I believe the Restatement should embody the broader orientation, one
that encompasses not merely the sense of the weight of authority, but a
broader range of considerations like those that guide courts in deciding the
direction of the law. Moreover, when there exists a readily discernible line
of competing authority on a question, that should be noted in the
comments 221 along with a sufficient explanation of the position taken in the
black-letter language and the Institute's rationale.
e. Restatement as Gesamtkunstwerk
The validity of an "is or ought" dichotomy is also undercut by the
broader focus of the restatements beyond statements of black-letter law, one
that addresses the policies and principles underlying the rules. There is
some evidence of this tendency even from the start. The founding Report
stated:
ought to be. However, I suspect that the natural desire to make improvements even when
the majority approach is relatively clear may sometimes come through too strongly ....
Id.
218. See CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI
REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 4 (2005) (emphasis added). It says that
"Restatement blackletter formulations assume the stance of describing the law as it is." Id. The
handbook was prepared by the Institute's Committee on Institute Style. See id. at viii.
219. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
220. Id. The Handbook elaborates:
A Restatement thus assumes the perspective of a common-law court, attentive to and
respectful of precedent, but not bound by precedent that is inappropriate or inconsistent
with the law as a whole ... but is instead expected to propose the better rule and provide
the rationale for choosing it. A significant contribution of the Restatements has also been
anticipation of the direction in which the law is tending ....
Restatements are instruments for innovations of this sort. Nevertheless, the
improvements wrought by Restatements are necessarily modest and incremental,
seamless extensions of the law as it presently exists.
Id. at 5.
221. See Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 83 ("The second
Restatement has followed the practice of stating expressly in the Comments or in the Reporter's
Notes" when it has adopted a so-called "minority position.").
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The restatement should be critical, because it must be more than a
collection and comparison of statutes and decisions, more than an
improved encyclopedia of law, more than an exposition of the
existing law, even though such exposition were an accurate
photograph of all the law's existing certainties and uncertainties.
There should be a thorough examination of legal theory. The
reason for the law as it is should be setforth . . .. 222
In the same year, Benjamin Cardozo explained the importance of the
restatements:
When, finally, it goes out ... it will be something less than a code
and something more than a treatise. It will be invested with unique
authority, not to command, but to persuade. It will embody a
composite thought and speak a composite voice .... Restatement is
needed, "not to repress the forces through which judgemade law
develops, but to stimulate and free them." 223
Wechsler believed that "the emphasis has shifted from dogmatic
affirmation to ... reasoned exposition., 224  And, Wade stated that "[t]he
Restatement can cut though this verbiage [when courts develop and state rule
in awkward fashion] and determine the essence of the rule. One of the
original concepts of the Institute was to find and express the principles
underlying the rules."225
This shift in focus reflects Wechsler's thesis that restaters should take
into account the same considerations that influence the courts. 226
Importantly, the approach of the courts to the common law has changed
from the notion "that the common law was an integral system existing
independently of the actions of the courts" in which the "function of the
courts was not to create the law but to discover it."227 A new view of the
law was emerging, one in which the law was "not entirely and irrevocably
changeless."22 8 Wade describes the shift:
222. Report of the Committee, supra note 101, at 14 (emphasis added).
223. Cardozo, supra note 105, at 9-10 (emphasis added) (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, Ministry
ofJustice, 35 HARV. L. REv. I13, 117 (1921)).
224. Wechsler, The Course of the Restatements, supra note 123, at 150.
225. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 74, 82 (referring to the
original concept for the restatements in "analyzing, organizing, and expressing ('re-stating') the
underlying principles in certain important fields of the law"). While acknowledging that restaters
normally look "to see if there is a clear majority rule," Wade said that they should also "look to the
broad principles underlying the rules governing particular issues and determine what rule is most
consistent with the general principles." Id. at 65.
226. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
227. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 63.
228. Id.
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[A] growing number of appellate courts have substantially changed
the nature of their approach. They are no longer discovering the
"true law" but are instead in the process of managing the developing
evolution of the common law in order to point it in the right
direction. These courts no longer hesitate to change a rule of law
when they decide that it is unjust and out of accord with current
ideals and mores and does not properly meet present social and
economic needs. Openly and frankly declaring that they are
changing the law, they are ready to regard this action as part of the
judicial function.229
This change is "quite relevant to an understanding of the task of the
Restaters."230 Thus, according to Wade, "the issue to be decided in
determining the common law rule in a particular state is not necessarily what
was the rule applied in its last judicial holding, but what the Institute
believes the state's highest court would now decide if the case were before it
at this time."231 This approach facilitates flexibility, thoughtful analysis, and
reasoned compromise. As Wade explained: "Sometimes .. . it is possible to
produce a compromise between the two positions-to take the more
desirable elements of each position and merge them into a single rule. This
felicitous result can aid not only in reforming the law but also in promoting
uniformity." 232
The distinction between stating the law as it is and as it ought to be has
also been attenuated by a change in the relative importance of the black-
letter part of the Restatement.233  Even with respect to the Restatement
(Second), its Reporter, Dean Wade, would. write that "the Blackletter loses
some of its dominance and serves more as an introduction to the
Comments."234 As the sophistication and extensiveness of the restatements'
comments and reporters' notes grow, the Restatement becomes more of a
229. Id.
230. Id. at 65.
231. Id. at 66.
232. Id. at 77.
233. See Frank, supra note 122, at 621, 623 ("The early Restatements were authoritative without
authorities. The commentaries were brief. Case analyses were not set out. . . . Serious changes
were made in the Second Restatement. Ex cathedra pronouncements were no longer the rule-
discussions by way of commentary were enlarged and expanded."); Hans A. Linde, Courts and
Torts: "Public Policy" Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 841-42 (1994) (stating
that "there is a generational change in style" between the First Restatement, which "did not
undertake policy justifications," and subsequent ones that incorporate policy justification, and noting
that "some drafts of the third Restatement give policy rationales such prominence that they may
appear as the views of the American Law Institute").
234. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute, supra note 72, at 75.
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Gesamtkunstwerk, with multiple components making up the whole
restatement architecture.
V. CONCLUSION
The latest project of the torts restatements235 declined to
comprehensively address the nature of the intent required for traditional
intentional torts such as battery. The Restatement (Third) defines intent,
stating that "[a] person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if ...
the person acts with the purpose of producing that consequence; or ... acts
knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result." 236 This
language defines the state of mind needed to support a finding that a
defendant intended a "consequence." However, it does not address what
"consequence" must have been intended in order to support various
traditional torts that require intent. Rather, we are told to look instead to the
Restatement (Second) for the details of many of the traditional intentional
torts, such as battery, until a future torts restatement project addresses the
matter. Unfortunately, the Restatement (Second) language to which the new
Restatement defers is ambiguous and perhaps inconsistent of what
"consequences" must have been intended in order to support the traditional
intentional torts such as battery. Delaying consideration of this may
perpetuate uncertainty over this crucial aspect of the element of intent, an
uncertainty that has existed since the first torts Restatement in 1935.
In this Article, I have also posited a possible formulation for the courts,
commentators, and the Institute to consider in their efforts to address the
uncertainty over the nature of the consequence that must have been intended
to support a claim for battery.
Additionally, I have reflected on the role of restatements. I believe the
drafters and the Institute should heed two goals. The first is to address and
reduce uncertainty and complexity, and, in doing so, keep the restatement
provisions current and vital. Secondly, I urge a more broadly conceived
proactive and creative perspective, one that strives not merely to mirror an
often largely inchoate and opaque multi-state tapestry, but rather to
thoughtfully rationalize and guide the development of the law. Thus, the
formulation of rules should not only be informed by a sense of the weight of
authority, but also guided by the sound underlying policy goals undergirding
the rules, especially when the state of the law is divided, unclear, unstable,
not fully manifest, or rapidly evolving.
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235. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
236. Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
